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I. INTRODUCTION TO PROGRESSIVE RECONSTRUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the prospects of a “Progressive 
Reconstruction” methodology for state building during and after military intervention in 
failed, failing or rogue states. Progressive Reconstruction requires cooperative civil-
military intervention and coordinated pre-intervention planning. It relies upon superior 
military force for rapid decisive operations, stabilization and sufficient resources for 
reconstruction in order to generate a stable peace. This is not peacekeeping, or even peace 
enforcement; it is military - political intervention into the sovereign affairs of a targeted 
state. It is an extreme measure taken in response to catastrophic events or in pre-emption 
of potentially catastrophic circumstances. In this regard, the argument as to why an 
intervention was initiated is not relevant to this discussion. What is relevant is that these 
operations are on going, and the United States will continue to play a significant role in 
them as long as it maintains its global leadership position.  Therefore, the United States 
must develop a strong and flexible doctrine for interventions and state building that both 
complements and supplements other national strategies for expeditionary operations. 
The current doctrine espoused by the United States is based on the concept of 
stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations (SSTR). SSTR operations 
encompass the military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from 
conflict to peace to establish or maintain order in states and regions.1 Military support to 
SSTR represents the U.S. Department of Defense’s activities that support U.S. 
Government plans for operations that lead to sustainable peace while advancing 
American interests.2 According to the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 
of 28 November 2005, military support to SSTR means establishing a sustainable peace 
while advancing U.S. interests. This is the new American intent, a policy of direct 
engagement. 
Prior to DoDD 3000.05 establishment, theoretical end-state development lagged, 
even as the United States was heavily committed to massive, costly SSTR operations in 
e a notable need for both unity of effort and unity of Afghanistan and Iraq. Despit                                                 
1 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 28 November 2005 
2 Ibid 
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command, American strategic planners continued to approach military intervention 
separately from post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Conflict resolution theories 
have focused on civil wars rather than externally driven regime change. Currently, no 
methodology for state building integrates the missions of externally imposed stabilization 
and reconstruction into one cohesive and flexible program.  
The goal of this thesis is to outline an organizational framework and methodology 
for SSTR and its desired end state—a stable peace—that will take full advantage of the 
window of opportunity created by rapid decisive military actions. Initially, this paper 
describes the implementation and activities of each part of the organization in theory and 
practice. Secondly, it will describe how the basic sequence of steps in the transition from 
element to element can be conducted via three programs: (1) the establishment of an 
interim government, (2) implementing the rule of law, and (3) providing, promoting, and 
sustaining civil security. An immediate requirement is for a strong implementing 
organization that is unified, immediately effective, and designed to facilitate long-term 
success. Additionally, this thesis will reference several interventions, wars, and colonial 
actions that occurred over a course of one hundred and sixty two years, from 1844 to the 
present. Conducting a comparative analysis of methods, the author intends to demonstrate 
how certain measures have been implemented historically and to identify necessary 
adjustments to programs for future application. The comparative analysis is necessary in 
order to find the relevant stabilization trends and determine their impact on the 
campaigns. 
 
A. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FAILED, FAILING OR ROGUE 
STATES 
Following the October 1993 ambush and firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 
which eighteen soldiers of an elite U.S. Army Ranger and Delta Force unit were killed, 
America unilaterally withdrew its military forces and was forced to revisit certain 
fundamentals of its military doctrine. As the Somalia mission began it was a 
humanitarian assistance operation, the peacekeeping principles of neutrality, non-
involvement in the inner workings of a sovereign government, and rapid exit were the 
prevailing principles.3 These principles failed in the face of determined resistance put on 
2 
by sub-national entities reportedly supported by trans-national terrorists. Likewise, the 
U.S. military is currently reconsidering its stabilization and reconstruction operations in 
the Middle East and in relation to the larger context of the global war on terrorism and 
the resurgent concept of state building.  
At issue is the fundamental nature of the American way of war. In a traditional 
war, or a conventional military expedition, with a major peer competitor, where the 
object is purely self-defense of the United States, our national interests, or our allies, 
decisive combat operations are designed to rapidly destabilize and destroy the enemy’s 
capacity to wage offensive war. This is often referred to as kinetic warfare, which denotes 
warfare that resembles and utilizes weapons that achieve their destructive effects by the 
shear force of their impact. However, in more common low-intensity conflicts that may 
or may not involve conventional warfare, such as Somalia and Kosovo, an approach that 
relies on kinetic force as the principle activity is not appropriate. A different approach is 
needed, one that must account for the realities of conventional warfare but where the end 
state is to stabilize and reform the state vice destroy and destabilize an adversary. This is 
an “empathetic warfare” approach that denotes warfare that attacks the willpower, the 
moral and physical capacity for resistance of an opponent through the cognitive 
dimension, the knowledge and understanding of who he is and how and why he fights.  
American forces are experts in kinetic war, but far less so in empathetic war. In 
the post-September 11th era, a lack of understanding of the opposition has generated new 
problems for nation states intervening in failed or failing states and regime change 
characterized by a loss of government control. These are problems that cannot be 
defeated by smart-bombs and direct assault. Internal or limited wars have formed the 
majority of security crises of this age. It is this type of conflict – what the United States 
Marine Corps has in the past called small wars – that concerns us here. In these conflicts 
disenfranchised persons are pitted against the state or subgroups within the state because 
of a desire to ensure security or self-actualization.3 More recently, pre-emptive 
intervention or regime change as espoused by the United States and exercised in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has placed the intervention force in the position of the government 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 28 November 2005, 8 
3 
in the small war. This is the physically stronger position but it often lacks moral 
legitimacy because foreigners externally impose it. 
Failed, failing, and rogue states are havens for international criminals and 
terrorists, and although international norms of state sovereignty prohibit intervention by 
one state in the domestic affairs of another, the international community can no longer 
ignore these internal conflicts.4 The international community, under the auspices of the 
United Nations, has deployed large peace keeping and peace enforcement forces to 
maintain stability in places that lacked legitimate authority such as the Congo (1960-
1964) and Somalia (1992-1993). The constant struggle for power in these fractured 
nations produces situations in which sub national groups continually resort to violence to 
gain political and economic power. Although external military interventions by both 
international and national actors generally attempted to aid extant regimes against 
destabilizing forces, the U.S.-led coalitions that invaded Iraq (2003 to present) and 
Afghanistan (2001 to present), deliberately destroyed the regimes there. The governance 
vacuums that resulted in both nations sparked more violent competition. Regional 
warlords vied for authority with Afghanistan’s interim government and then elected 
leader Hamid Karzai and his government, and multiple insurgencies arose in Iraq to 
challenge the U.S. coalition and the interim governing councils it supported. The current 
doctrine for SSTR operations is not designed to disrupt and defeat this competition 
sufficiently. 
1. Current U.S. Doctrine 
Current U.S. doctrine describes post-conflict efforts as the phase of a military 
operation, which is characterized as those actions following the imposition of order 
within a disrupted society. The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 “Stability and Support 
Operations” describes four generic campaign phases: deter/engage; seize initiative; 
decisive operations; and transition. Stability operations, according to U.S. Army doctrine, 
are vital to contain conflicts during hostilities and to secure the environment for civilian 
                                                 
4 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping,” Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992 
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authorities after the “decisive” actions.”5 Stability operations, then, occur after the 
decisive operations phase and enable the transition to self-sustaining peace—the pre-
requisite for the redeployment of stabilization forces.6  
In an SSTR operation military ground force is essential for the establishment of 
stability. Current Joint Military doctrine for Military Operations Other than War 
(MOOTW), JPUB 3-07, states that the role of the military should decline as the target 
state becomes more secure. The doctrine points out that military and civilian personnel 
with administrative and reconstruction skills should replace the combat soldiers over 
time. This process is currently gradual and ad-hoc in nature and focused more on the 
military exit strategy than the explicit goal of SSTR operations, namely, a political and 
societal stable peace.  
A major flaw in the joint doctrine is the lack of integration between the initial 
intervention and stabilization operations and the long-term reconstruction effort. Even the 
emerging doctrine, FM 3-05.40 “Civil Affairs Operations - Initial Draft” from 30 October 
2005 and the FM Interim 3-07.22 “Counterinsurgency Operations” put in place 1 October 
2004 and to be replaced 1 October 2006, does not address clearly through what method 
and to what extent civilian and military teams for stabilization and reconstruction should 
be integrated. Yet historical counterinsurgency operations are very clear on this point. 
General Sir Gerald Templar and the Briggs Plan demonstrated this integration effectively 
during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)7, effective integration and unity of effort is 
necessary to enable success in all aspects of an intervention including humanitarian 
assistance, civil administration, and political and economic reconstruction.8  
Current MOOTW doctrine is based on participation in UN peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations, short-term noncombatant evacuation operations and 
 assistance missions. There is no current doctrine for limited duration humanitarian
                                                 
5 Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07 (FM 100-20), Stability Operations and 
Support Operations February 2003, 1-2 
6 Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07 (FM 100-20), Stability Operations and 
Support Operations February 2003, 1-3 
7 Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, the Malayan Emergency: 1948-1960, (New York: 
Bantam 1971 (1987)) Chapters 7 and 14 
8 Colonel Peter Menk, Post Conflict Requirements Workshop, (Center for Strategic Learning Issues 
Paper 1-01 January 2001) 2 
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forcibly imposed state building. The last doctrinal publications written for this type of 
operation were the U.S.MC “Small Wars Manual” of 1940 and the U.S. Army and Navy 
“Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs” of 22 December 1943. Both of these 
manuals were written prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1945 UN Charter.  
Inevitably, there are doctrinal and conceptual conflicts among these documents. The 
current standard based on the UN Charter provides no guidance to military forces 
engaged in forcible state building. Realistic, innovative, and definitive adjustments to 
stability operations frameworks need to be made accordingly. The transitions — from the 
military intervention to the post conflict reconstruction phase to a stable peace — are 
procedural and conceptual gaps in U.S. SSTR doctrine. 
In order to achieve the goal of a stable peace, both civilian and military decision-
makers must be prepared to implement all aspects of an intervention from the very 
beginning. The imperativeness of this statement is amplified by the fact that at the start of 
intervention operations, which means the planning stage, civilian agencies tend to have 
staffing, administrative, communications, and logistics problems in the regions in which 
SSTR operations will be required. Country specific security and logistics concerns often 
dictate that only the U.S. military is best positioned to initially respond to the crisis. 
Currently, the U.S. military provides significant administrative, logistical, and equipment 
support to civilian-run non-governmental agencies (NGOs) who supplies large numbers 
of administrative personnel through liaison and deploying military wherever international 
agencies and participating governments either fail to or are unable to provide the 
necessary resources. Non-governmental organizations became prominent participants in 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the 1990s, but their limited logistical transportation 
and security capabilities often limit their operations to urban areas. In Afghanistan, the 
U.S. military established mixed civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams to 
address local security and reconstruction needs in the countryside where the central 
Afghan government did not operate effectively and where NGOs found it too dangerous 
to provide reconstruction services. 
6 
The transition to post-conflict requires sustained commitment and cooperation 
among U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense. However, it 
must be recognized that during the early stages of an intervention the military can operate 
independently.9 A military force that has neutralized major armed opposition will be 
grudgingly respected, and in some instances, welcomed, at the outset of transitional 
activities. This break with the target state’s political and military past creates a window of 
opportunity to reshape the political order during an intervention. However, this window, 
as Robert Orr elegantly observed, is not only narrow, it is intimately related to the 
military operation itself:   
Patterns of governance and participation are not open for discussion 
during a conflict and are most malleable in the period soon after the 
conflict ends. For the U.S. and other international actors to have any hope 
of affecting these fundamental issues, they must be ready to engage before 
lines harden.10 
With the passing of time, resistance is to be expected from those who believe their 
security and welfare to be under threat either by the intervention or by societal contests 
for power. This is particularly acute in states suffering from long-term conflicts.11 The 
failure of the military to plan and structure its forces appropriately to deal with these 
conflicts can be detrimental to the short-term goal of achieving a stable security situation 
and devastating to the long-term goal of establishing a sustainable peace.  
2. Overwhelming Force and Sustainable Peace 
Sustainable peace is the decisive turning point where the target state is capable of 
providing its own security, maintaining the rule of law, and exercising a free and 
independent democratic government without extensive external military and civilian 
support. The achievement of sustainable peace requires a major long-term commitment of 
foreign forces. It is not one that most nations are willing to or capable of accepting. For 
the United States to commence one of these projects, it requires vital national interest to 
be engaged. Once begun, the use of force must not be qualified. Political and military 
objectives must be synchronized and executed in unison, with public support assured at  
 
 
                                                 
9 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 28 November 2005 
10 Robert Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol 25, No 4, (Autumn 2002), 139-152. 
11 Ramesh Thakur, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), 387-410: 394 
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the outset. Once U.S. forces are committed they must not be constrained by the vagaries 
of neutrality and should be designed to deal with the asymmetric threats common to 
insurgency.  
Global national and international leaders would do well to follow the Colin 
Powell-Caspar Weinberger doctrine of applying overwhelming force and organization 
when making the decision to intervene. The emphasis in this doctrine currently rests upon 
the use of overwhelming force in a combat operation. The adaptation of the doctrine 
necessary now would be to first determine that the United States possesses the capability 
to defeat an adversary by a large margin, and second that it possesses the capability to 
bring the same level of effort into non-combat operations. Although the U.S. military 
easily overwhelms most military adversaries in the kinetic fight, less focus has been 
given to assembling the capacity to overwhelm subversives in SSTR operations or the 
empathic fight.  
Overwhelming force in SSTR operations is different than in standard military 
operations. SSTR is designed to build capacity rather than to destroy. Unlike a 
conventional military action like the 1990 Persian Gulf War, SSTR cannot be brought to 
quick decision through combat. Once a vital national security interest is identified leaders 
must prepare the home front for long-term operations filled with peaks and valleys.12 
SSTR often concludes without defeat in a classical military sense such as Napoleon met 
at Waterloo. Victory may leave combatants merely defused, disarmed and integrated into 
society. The goal is to build internal capacity so as to avoid creating “quasi-permanent” 
dependencies.13 To build this capacity will require a large input of manpower, money and 
time, three things not easily given.  
 
B. PROGRESSIVE RECONSTRUCTION 
Progressive Reconstruction fills the need for a comprehensive state building 
methodology; it is not peacekeeping. Historically these operations are relatively common 
having occurred on a consistent basis over time. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
                                                 
12 Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 2004) 103 
13 Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University, 2004) 104 
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centuries small wars tied to the colonial push by western nations were staples of 
international relations. Even then successful colonial small war strategies incorporated to 
some extent state rehabilitation or construction of infrastructure and governmental 
organization. They focused on the isolation of the noncombatant population and tried to 
win them over through the original hearts and minds campaigns. The tache d‘huille, oil 
patch or oil spot technique is one such program that has been reworked many times.14 
The oil spot technique is called such because it is a form of area dominance that begins, 
like a drop of oil, in single spot and then spreads to coat an entire region or province. 
However most of these activities had the exploitation of resources and or the 
establishment of permanent colonies as an ulterior motive, which tended to drive the 
indigenous populations into the arms of revolutionaries. 
1. Historical Precedent 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries colonialism was 
commonplace. Theories for intervention into the affairs of non-western states abounded. 
As popular support for imperialism waned, consensus developed around the concepts of 
indirect rule, meaning rule would be managed indirectly through indigenous agents, and 
managed cheaply and efficiently regarding personnel and treasure.15 Following this line, 
much of colonial warfare was based on the occupation, subjugation and organization of 
territory and its indigenous peoples for profit. For example, General Hubert Lyautey in 
the French campaigns in Morocco was less concerned with the clash of armies and more 
concerned with the preservation and exploitation of the productive potential of the target 
region.16 The use of indirect rule, the governing of a state through a native organization, 
was the vehicle for exploitation.17 Colonial power was thus deeply entrenched in the 
governance of the state, but through indirect means.    
                                                 
14 Jean Gottman, “Chapter 10. Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial 
Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward M. 
Earle (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 248 
15 Douglas Porch, Wars of Empire, Smithsonian History of Warfare Series, (New York: Harper-
Collins, 2000, 2006). 
16 Jean Gottman, “Chapter 10. Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial 
Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward M. 
Earle (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 235. 
17 Terence Craig Coen, The Indian Political Service. A Study in Indirect Rule, (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1971). Chapter 3, “Indirect Rule,” 14-15. 
9 
After World War I, small wars continued to occur. The U.S. intervention in the 
Dominican Republic 1916-1921 was a prime example of an American small war. United 
States Marine and Navy leaders, like Colonel Joseph Pendelton, realized the need for a 
combination of civil and military measures. They strengthened civilian governing 
structures at local and national levels and declared martial law. This in addition to the 
creation of a Gendarmerie—a national military police force responsible for criminal 
policing, crowd control and protection of vital infrastructure and personnel—was a 
version of indirect rule and constituted blatant external involvement in the internal affairs 
of a sovereign state.18 
Post-World War II small wars were cast in the shadow of the Cold War, in local 
conflicts that were surrogates of a larger struggle between communist-East and 
democratic-West. The anti-colonial movement was heavily influenced with arms and 
advisors by the Cold War powers in a similar pattern to the competition between colonial 
powers before WWI. In many cases, local conflicts such as the conflict in the Congo 
Republic took on international value as proxy wars for the superpowers with the United 
Nations caught in the middle. In the Congo, the United Nations attempted through the 
concepts of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping to remain neutral while also 
providing military and governance support to the state.19 The UN attempted to walk a 
thin line of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo while trying to maintain 
the peace. This operation violated the extant norms of peacekeeping, then confined to 
inter-positional missions between states who have signed an agreement, conducted by 
impartial, lightly armed observers. Difficulties in the Congo in the 1960s caused a 
reaffirmation of those norms until the end of the Cold War and the pressing needs of 
humanitarian crises within states emerged in the 1990’s.  
With the end of the Cold War many hidden or suppressed rivalries and conflicts 
surfaced as the major powers national interests changed. Although the superpowers had 
not participated in peacekeeping prior to this time, the U.S. played a role in several 
                                                 
18 Keith Bickel, Mars Learning, The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2001) Chapter 4, “Intervention in the Dominican Republic and Lessons 
Learned,” 112. 
19 Even Luard, A History of the United Nations. Volume 2: The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965, 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), 198-316: 308 
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stabilization and reconstruction operations in the 1990s.20 The heaviest U.S. involvement 
was the UN-sanctioned mission in Somalia and participation with NATO military forces 
in the Balkans. The UN, meanwhile, had undertaken its most robust governance effort in 
Cambodia in 1993.21 In each of these cases, certain and varied amounts of governmental 
control passed into the hands of the intervention forces. With these operations the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states began to slide. 
However, following the prescriptions of Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, the 
UN began to consider it the responsibility of the world body to intervene when a state 
proved a threat to the security of its people, or proved unable to protect its people from 
harm. This intrusion in internal affairs is by nature much more difficult than 
peacekeeping. What was discovered was that the use of force even by UN troops is never 
impartial.22 
Two U.S. post-9/11 interventions (in Afghanistan and Iraq) involved both major 
military commitments and the destruction of the previous regimes. The United States 
claimed a rarely used principle of self-defense, that is, pre-emptive defense.23 These 
combat operations were characterized by rapid strikes by relatively small but powerful 
forces focused on regime change but not on the post conflict activity of state building. In 
other words stabilization and reconstruction forces were not pre-deployed and waiting in 
the wings. The SSTR forces for these two states were once again assembled ad hoc but 
with fewer forces available on hand to be detailed to this mission.  
                                                 
20 Andrea L. Hoshmand, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” (International Security 
and Economic Policy Project Course, 10 May 2005) 3 
21 Sorpong Peou, “Implementing Cambodia’s Peace Agreement,” in Stephen J. Stedman, (ed). 499-
530: 505 
22 Ramesh Thakur, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 32, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), 387-410: 405 
23 Indeed, the United Nations declared the Al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 to be a breach of international 
peace and security, opening the door for the U.S. to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter for a 
self-defense claim, although the defense would be against the terrorist organization al Qaeda, and not 
Afghanistan itself. See John Yoo, “Using Force,” The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 71, No. 3, 
Summer 2004. The U.S. failed to gain explicit UN authorization for the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, Kofi 
Annan in 2004 said that in his view, the U.S. invasion was “illegal.” Colum Lynch, U.S. Allies Dispute 
Annan on Iraq War, Washington Post (September 17, 2004), A18. Australia, Britain and the United States 
have insisted that the terms of the cease fire agreements ending the 1991 Persian Gulf War provided 
authority for military action.  
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Humanitarian and development aid have long been remedies to environmental 
factors that enable insurgency, although it seems UN and U.S. policy makers have only 
recently rediscovered this fact.24 Also recently rediscovered is the tendency of 
insurgencies to be attracted to outlying regions that have no garrison like presence.25 
Destabilized urban areas and lawless hinterlands are traditional havens for guerilla 
insurgencies. Due to its effectiveness against modern conventional western militaries 
guerilla style conflict will be the principle activity of warfare for the foreseeable future.26 
Therefore the stabilization forces arrayed against it should be prepared in conjunction 
with combat forces prior to military intervention to deal with guerilla combat. 
Progressive reconstruction applies insights from historical experience to these probable 
contingencies. 
2. Projecting Stability Through Organization 
Post conflict reconstruction activities have tended to be concentrated in major 
urban areas, near supporting infrastructure such as hotels, ports and airfields, where 
impaired governments and international security forces can exercise security. These 
secure localities tend to become the focus of aid and reconstruction efforts to the 
detriment of the rural or outlying regions and cause uneven development in both the short 
and long term.27 In Afghanistan as in Somalia before it the massing of aid agencies in the 
more secure urban capitals inevitably drew the rural populations into the cities creating 
an internally displaced person issue. Additionally, the resulting overcrowding 
overwhelmed the municipal services. The overcrowding caused sanitation issues as well 
as monetary instability as prices for rents and goods reflected the increased demand in 
part from the aid agencies themselves. The influx of foreign money with the arrival of 
NGO’s and other agencies tended to create its own economic issues for good and ill.  
                                                 
24 Michael J. McNerney, “Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” 
Parameters (Winter 2005-2006) 32-46 
25 For a historical example, see Keith Bickel, Mars Learning, The Marine Corps’ Development of 
Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2001) Chapter 4, “Intervention in the 
Dominican Republic and Lessons Learned,” 157 
26 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations,” Center For Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Working 
Paper (November 12, 2003) 23 
27 Keith Bickel, Mars Learning, The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940, 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2001) Chapter 4, “Intervention in the Dominican Republic and Lessons 
Learned,” 157 
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Progressive Reconstruction is designed to break this tendency to urban centric 
operations by placing specially designed stabilization and reconstruction forces 
throughout the target state. By rapidly establishing support centers and security forces in 
remote regions away from the major urban centers Progressive Reconstruction will create 
smaller more manageable centers of attraction that will prove better at providing stability 
and support to the local conditions.  
In this manner Progressive Reconstruction has some commonality with the French 
colonial concept of progressive occupation, a type of indirect rule, from the late 
nineteenth century and incorporates elements of organization such as the tache d‘huille, 
and quadrillage et ratisage or gridding and searching concepts from the early and mid-
twentieth century.28 These concepts assumed the initial conventional military victory in 
an intervention and focused on the immediate and long-term conservation and 
rehabilitation of the occupied territory. They provided for the stabilization of the country 
by placing specially designed static paramilitary forces into regional zones. These forces 
were then backed up by highly mobile reserves.29  
It must be pointed out however, that ultimately the theories of indirect rule failed 
when put into practice, because they sought to stabilize and exploit colonies, rather than 
to stabilize and work with free nations. Will similar activities work today and tomorrow 
toward the goal of state stabilization if the end state is clearly changed? Progressive 
Reconstruction, in keeping with the ideals of democracy, independence and self-
determination, is not intended to create a colony for exploitation but to create a viable 
self-governing state that can take its place as a productive member of the world body.    
3. The Functions of Progressive Reconstruction  
Creating the organization for governance, security and the rule of law is the most 
important step of Progressive Reconstruction. It requires top down planning with bottom 
up refinement and stresses the unity of effort that is a must to successful SSTR 
operations. As stated this is not peacekeeping or peace enforcement, it will be perceived 
                                                 
28 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, A French view of Counterinsurgency, (New York: Fredrick A. 
Preager, 1964). 51 
29 Jean Gottman, “Chapter 10. Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial 
Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, Militayr Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward M. 
Earle (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 264 
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even in the instance of an invited intervention as occupation because of the heavy 
military presence. In fact by international law and custom this type of operation must 
follow the laws of occupation. These rules require the intervention force to provide for 
the basic governance, security, rule of law and humanitarian assistance of the territory be 
it liberated or conquered. 
Progressive Reconstruction commences with pre-intervention civilian-military 
integrated planning and training. This integrated planning ensures that stabilization and 
reconstruction objectives will be targeted for seizure in the initial operation. Upon 
implementation Progressive Reconstruction assumes the defeat or expulsion of 
belligerents and focuses on the immediate deployment of an interim military government. 
The interim government and its attendant forces provide security and the rule of law. In 
support martial law will be proclaimed as a means of providing legal authority to ensure 
compliance.30 The overarching intent behind the pre-planned organization is to prevent a 
power vacuum in the wake of the interventions combat forces. To this end security and 
the rule of law bolster governance. 
Immediate security, rule of law, and governance are accomplished by the rapid 
establishment of regional development zones (RDZ) and insertion of provincial 
reconstruction team’s (PRT). A PRT as envisioned in Progressive Reconstruction is an 
interdisciplinary civilian-military unit designed to provide a stabilization and 
reconstruction capability to a military intervention. Establishing RDZ’s in conjunction 
with regular force rear area operations ensures the lines of communication are protected 
for additional combat operations, as well as securing key infrastructure and personnel for 
post conflict operations. The PRT’s ensure that the local populace is directly engaged and 
local conditions are rapidly addressed. The gradual move from military to civilian control 
lends to the building of strong civil administrative institutions that in turn build the state. 
The transfer of security responsibilities to indigenous forces and the increased self-
sufficiency of the indigenous people lends to the withdrawal of the intervention force and 
the growth of a stable peace. 
                                                 
30 Ralph H Gabriel, “American Experience with Military Government,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol 49, Issue 4 (July 1944), 630-643. 634 
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Achieving the goal of a stable peace requires “a nuanced approach that 
progressively strengthens the central government” and addresses local issues.31 
Progressive Reconstruction allows the indigenous people to focus on recovery by 
providing stability and helps build the new government from bottom up. To this end the 
protection of the people must be a goal of the interim government. Some levels of 
protection are at odds with the desired end state of a liberal democracy.32 This is not to 
say that interim governance should be authoritarian. Interim governance needs to be 
designed in such a manner as to bring all elements of society into the democratic 
process.33 Clear political objectives maintained throughout will help keep the people 
focused and build understanding of the deliberate but inevitably slow process of 
government organization and institution building. 
In Chapter II of this thesis the proposed organization of Progressive 
Reconstruction will be detailed extolling the centralized planning and decentralized 
execution that is needed in SSTR operations. The organization of the government, 
security and rule of law institutions will reflect this. The imposition of order and the 
temporary relief of governance envisioned in Progressive Reconstruction would give the 
target state and multinational support forces the opportunity to select, train and integrate a 
governmental system deliberately over time that is not rushed or cobbled together.34 If 
the indigenous governmental system is stood up too quickly, it risks collapse from 
corruption and subversion. If stood up too slowly, the damage done may be irreparable. 
This concept of momentum, relative superiority, and decisive windows of opportunity for 
stabilization will be discussed further in Chapter III. The United States through 
Progressive Reconstruction can enable the temporary relief necessary for the host nation 
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II. INVERVENTION PLANNING 
Creating the appropriate organization for a successful intervention is crucial to the 
success of Progressive Reconstruction. Unity of command and thereby, unity of effort, 
are necessary for dynamic SSTR operations. Integrated planning of the interim, military 
and civilian governments is the first step. By interim government it is meant exactly a 
temporary government that acts as steward and regent in place of the deposed or fallen 
regime. Planning should divide the target state into sub-regions and assign regional 
military commands to them. These commands should have an offensive and defensive 
military capability as well as a robust reconstruction and humanitarian assistance 
footprint. These regional commands will deploy immediately on the heels of rapid 
decisive operations (RDO) to support the overall interim government intent. Once in 
place they should organize their area of operation to best influence long duration 
stabilization, reconstruction and transition operations. The focus of effort should be upon 
providing governance, law enforcement and security. Humanitarian assistance missions 
are subordinate to and integrated with overall stabilization. A modified Provincial 
Reconstruction team will be the mode of implementation within the RDZ. The 
overarching intent behind the pre-planned organization is to prevent a power vacuum in 
the wake of the interventions combat forces. 
 
A. INTERIM GOVERNMENT 
As defined by United States Marine Corps doctrine, interim government is the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a military commander or civilian administrator over a territory 
or region as directed by the President of the United States.35 In this sense, it differs from 
definitions of interim government that would include those developed by indigenous 
actors in revolutionary regimes, caretaker transitional regimes led by outgoing rulers, or 
internationally administered regimes directed by the UN. Here the term implies externally 
imposed governance over a period of time by a military commander or civilian 
administrator over belligerents or other inhabitants of a foreign state during war or in the 
                                                 
35 USMC, Small Wars Manual,1940  (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Press) Sect 13 
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immediate post conflict.36 An interim military or civilian government is a government 
imposed by force or by agreement where the law of war determines the legality of its 
acts.37 The establishment of an interim military or civilian government does not transfer 
sovereignty; the intervening power gains the authority to exercise limited sovereign like 
rights through the use of power in accordance to the law of war.38 The establishment of 
an interim military or civilian government becomes necessary in both an invasion-based 
intervention and civil affairs based intervention when the legitimate government fails, or 
ceases to exist.   
According to Article 6 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, an interim military 
government is intended to administer areas occupied by force where the legitimate 
government no longer exercises its functions.39 The word "occupation", as used in 
Article 6, has a wider meaning than it has in Article 42 of the Regulations annex to the 
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. So far as individuals are concerned, the application of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention does not depend upon the existence of a state of 
occupation within the meaning of the Article 42 referred to above. The relations between 
the civilian population of a territory and troops advancing into that territory are governed 
by the present Convention whether they are fighting or not. There is no intermediate 
period between what might be termed the invasion phase and the inauguration of a stable 
regime of occupation. Even a patrol that penetrates into enemy territory without any 
intention of staying there must respect the Conventions in its dealings with the civilians it 
meets. When it withdraws, for example, it cannot take civilians with it, for that would be 
contrary to Article 49, which prohibits the deportation or forcible transfer of persons from 
occupied territory. It is responsible as the representative of the intervening power to 
restore and maintain public order, ensure human rights and provide the rule of law to the 
targeted territory.40 The interim government discussed here is the occupier and has the 
                                                 
36 This would be the “revolutionary provisional” type of interim governance in the typology provided 
by Yossi Shain and Juan Linz (eds.) Between States. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
37 Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12.1A Chpt 6, Sec I. General, Art. 358, Nature of 
Government. 
38 Ibid 
39 Geneva Conventions 1949, Art 6. & Art 45. 
40 Geneva Conventions 1949, Art 47 & Hague Regulations 1907 Art 43  
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legal capacity of the “legitimate power” to meet these obligations. The same is true for a 
follow on civilian run interim government. Progressive Reconstruction requires a civilian 
interim government to take over from military governors as soon as practicable, for 
example, when security is established. This civilian government must be designed 
concurrently and in conjunction with the military planning.  
The interim regimes have the authority to govern the target state however; these 
do not usurp national sovereignty. According to the Geneva Conventions and the United 
Nations Charter the sovereignty of a nation resides with the people and cannot be 
deprived or supplanted. In circumstances where the host nation’s government is unwilling 
or unable to govern an interim government may be established. A field manual from the 
World War II era notes, “Sovereignty is not transferred by reason of occupation but the 
right of control passes to the occupying force, limited only by international law and 
custom.”41 This type of government whether administered by officers of the intervening 
military force; by foreign civilians or by indigenous civilians left in office is the 
government of and for all the inhabitants, native or foreign.42 Civil functionaries who are 
retained will be protected in the performance of their duties by the intervening military 
forces. The local laws and ordinances may be left in force. In general, however, they are 
subject to being in whole or in part suspended and others substituted in their stead, at the 
discretion of the governing authority in accordance with international law.  
1. The Military Governor and the Civilian Administrator 
The military commander or the civilian administrator by Presidential Order 
exercises an interim government with expressed or implied sanction of Congress, or by a 
United Nation’s Mandate or both. The Commander is the representative of the United 
States and or the World Body and should be guided in his actions by the policies, and 
principles of justice in accordance with international laws and treaties, the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, and the Law of Land Warfare. The commander bears responsibility 
for interim government and is considered the Military Governor. Like a Roman 
Proconsul, the commander is in singular charge of all efforts military and civilian giving 
direction and coordination towards a common goal.  
                                                 
41 United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, Washington 1943, 1 
42 USMC, Small Wars Manual, 1940 (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Press) Sect 13-8 
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Leadership in an intervention requires not only the ability to lead in a military 
sense but also to understand how to coordinate, and communicate with civilian 
organizations and to achieve consensus. Unity of Command must reach beyond just 
military functions. The goal is to ensure that the commander of the operation views the 
intervention as a whole entity not as two parts; integrating the warfighting with the state 
building efforts. Additionally unified territorial commands would need to be established 
in the occupied territory and the leaders of these must also be capable of this dual 
responsibility. This would create not an occupied point but a zone, and not a military post 
but a center of influence and action.43 All of these zones must answer to a common 
leader; a leader who also commanded the initial intervention. This will further enhance 
the prestige of the occupying forces. Unity of command was noted as essential, even in 
the colonial period as clearly stated by French General Hubert Lyautey “A colonial 
expedition should always be under the command of the chief appointed to be the first 
administrator of the country after its conquest.”44  
In order that unity of command be achieved; the military commander who leads 
the intervention must also be the Interim Military Governor. This will give the 
commander symbolic ownership of the post-conflict as well as the conflict. In planning 
this relationship, the personnel and infrastructure that will be key to post-conflict 
operations must be identified and protected during the combat operation. Once the initial 
combat operations are underway, the commander supervises, through his Officer in 
Charge for Civil Affairs (OICCA) and civil affairs staff, the establishment of Regional 
Development Zone’s (RDZ) and the insertion of PRT’s. The RDZ relieves the population 
from the potential insurgent’s threat by providing for the basics of survival and security. 
The RDZ commander undertakes proactive measures that serve to convince the 
population that their situation will improve. It demonstrates this commitment to the 
intensive, long duration concentration of efforts, resources and personnel by being on 
                                                 
43 Jean Gottman, “Chapter 10. Bugead, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial 
Warfare,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward M. 
Earle (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1948), 243 
44 Ibid. 
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scene immediately and efficiently.45 This type of coordinated response can only be put 
forth if there is unity of effort. This intense unity of effort requires unity of command. 
This unity of command must reside in a single commander who has authority over all 
activities military and civilian within a target state. To this end the Military Governor will 
remain in overall command of both military and civilian operations until rapid decisive 
operations (RDO) are complete and all the RDZ are occupied. The transfer of powers to 
the Civilian Administrator can be affected at this time. 
The Civilian Administrator must not only be familiar with civic action and 
politics, but also the use of military force, as she or he will be the Chief Executive with 
powers representing the Commander-in-Chief. Prior to the intervention, the Civilian 
Administrator must be designated and involved in the operation planning. The Civilian 
Administrator takes over when the RDO are complete and the RDZ are fully established. 
The Military Governor will then turn over command of the military forces to the National 
Military Commander who will in turn be subordinate to the Civilian Administrator.  
The relationship of the Civilian Administrator to the Military Governor is similar 
in concept to the relationship between Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and 
the Commander Land Forces (CLF) in an amphibious assault. In an amphibious assault 
the CATF is in command until the CLF is established and capable of taking command 
ashore. The passage of command is conducted as a battle hand over where staffs and 
commanders transfer information. In the planning phases the two cooperate towards the 
common goal with the CATF acting as the coordinating authority. During planning, 
matters on which the CATF and CLF are unable to agree are referred to their common 
superior for decision.46 In this sense the Military Governor would be in the role of CATF 
and the Civilian Administrator the CLF. Here the common superior would be the 
President of the United States. The battle hand over would be conducted once the 
Military Governor declares the RDZ are sufficiently secure and the Civilian 
Administrator is capable of taking command.  
 
                                                 
45 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice. New York: Preager, 1968 (2005) 
79 
46 Joint Pub 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, pp II-1 to II-17, XVI-1 to XVI-8, 
XVII-6, XVII-10. 
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2. Martial Law  
Under the Military Governor or Civilian Administrator the interim government 
has the authority to exercise limited sovereign like rights. One sovereign-like right that 
must be exercised is the imposition of martial law. Martial law is the administration of 
the law by a duly constituted military or civilian authority.47 In an intervention of the 
type intended by Progressive Reconstruction the immediate implementation of martial 
law in areas under military control is a necessity and is in keeping with international law. 
The intervening military is required by law to provide protection to the inhabitants and 
infrastructure that fall under its control due to acts of war.48 Martial law needs to be 
implemented in order to ensure the legitimacy of the law enforcement role for the 
military and the interim government. 
Martial law and interim government seem to be anti-democratic practices, as 
described by one observer in 1944, “The connotation of Martial Law is tyranny.”49 It 
provides, however, a device by which the intervention force guarantees public order. 
Francis Lieber explains this in his famous General Order 100, Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, April 24, 1863: 
Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the 
laws and usages of war...Military oppression is not Martial Law: it is the 
abuse of the power which that law confers...As Martial Law is executed by 
military force, it is incumbent on those who administer it to be strictly 
guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues adorning 
a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses 
the power of his arms against the unarmed.50 
Martial law reflects the two basic principles of military government; these can be 
adopted by the interim government discussed in this thesis.51 The first is the function of 
military government during conflict is to assist the combatant forces in the 
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accomplishment of their mission. The second is that military necessity and international 
law dictates military government to safeguard and secure the population and 
infrastructure of the areas already under military control. 
Military authority in this instance rises above civil authority, yet the military 
governor is in fact governed by law. It is the “conscious effort to carry into the office of 
the military governor the old American concept of a government of laws and not of 
men.”52 An example is the public warning to the indigenous people, the proclamation of 
interim government and martial law. By right an interim government proclaims itself.53 
However, an official proclamation announcing to the people that an interim government 
has been established and advising them in general as to their expected conduct is advised. 
The inhabitants do not owe allegiance to the interim government; but they do owe 
obedience.54 The proclamation should include information on the relationship of the 
intervention forces and the civilian populace as well as the former belligerents and 
government employees. Prior knowledge of local customs is a key piece to enforcing 
rules and regulations. Avoidance of regulations counter to long-standing cultural beliefs 
is necessary. “Government, whether it be military or civil must be adjusted to the culture 
of the peoples governed.”55 The tenants of the proclamation must be known and clearly 
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The following is an example proclamation and supplemental order as issued by 
the author during Operation Iraqi Freedom56:  
 
AN NASR, IRAQ APRIL 27, 2003 STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING 
 




It is the responsibility of the police to provide impartial non-partisan assistance 
to the community in matters of security, public and private, and to ensure the welfare and 
safety of the residents of An Nasr and the surrounding villages. The size of the Police 
Force is based upon the needs of the community and is established by the Town Council, 
their mission is to Protect and to serve the Community. The Senior Coalition Military 
Officer for the Region must approve all Appointments. This is now Captain Karl C. Rohr, 
United States Marine Corps.  
 
Rules and Regulations: 
 
1. Local Laws and government are to be in force. Local criminal courts have Jurisdiction 
over Iraqi Citizens. Obedience of the orders of the Commander of the Coalition Forces is 
to be expected of all. Those who disobey such orders or regulations, or commit acts of 
hostility against the Coalition Forces will be dealt with according to the Rules of Land 
Warfare: taken into custody as enemy prisoners of war or illegal combatants. All who 
cheerfully accept the coalition forces will be protected. 
 
2. The Coalition Forces are not your enemy, only the enemy of those who misgoverned you. 
We come to help re-establish the Rule of Law and the Way of Peace to enable you to 
resume your ordinary occupations. 
 
3. All Coalition Forces are subject to United States Military Law, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the Laws of Land Warfare as accepted by the United States 





-It is unlawful to sell or attempt to sell to members of this Command any Drugs 
or Alcohol. 
-To engage the members of this Command in any Commercial Dealings without 
Approval from the Commanding Officer. 
-To act as a spy or to supply information to the opposing forces. 
-To cause damage to public property or utilities. 
-To impair sources of fresh water. 
-To destroy, damage, or hide any kinds of supplies or materials useful or 
belonging to the Civil Government. 
-To aid prisoners to escape, or willingly assist the opposing forces. 
-To harm or injure members of the Coalition Forces. 
-To attempt to influence members of the Coalition Forces to fail or be derelict in 
the performance of their duties. 
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-To damage or alter military signs or notices. 
-To recruit troops or cause desertion from the local Police Forces. 
-To commit any act of War, Treason, or to violate the Laws of War. 
-To spread Alarmist or false reports, to swear falsely. 
-To interfere with coalition troops. 
-To commit arson or to unlawfully convert property to the injury of Coalition 
Forces. 
-To signal or communicate with opposing forces by any means. 
-To sketch, film or photograph places or materials used by the coalition forces. 
-To perform any act in substantial obstruction to the civil or military 
Governments. 
-To Violate any proclamation or regulation issued by the Coalition Forces. 
-To conspire, attempt to do so, or aid and abet anyone violating the foregoing 
regulations. 
 
3. Organization  
The organization and planning of the interim government is every bit as important 
as the planning and execution of the combat operations. In fact, the two should not be 
separated for they are mutually supporting. The efficient administration of an interim 
government requires that the personnel appointed or assigned be particularly qualified. 
Unlike rapid decisive operations that rely on maneuver, speed and concentration, 
maximizing combat technologies, to overwhelm the enemy’s capacity to resist, stability 
operations rely on presence, the rule of law, and civic action. Therefore, stability 
operations differ from RDO in that they require maximized manpower supported by 
technology. Approached differently RDO relies more on kinetic operations while 
stabilization relies more on empathic operations. This is due to the fact that the target of 
stability operations is the people’s susceptibility to insurgency and criminality as opposed 
to the enemy armed forces capacity to resist.57 Thus, the organization of the military and 
civilian forces that face stabilization must be different than that involved in combat 
operations. The difference begins with leadership and flows through the organization of 
the force.  
a. The National Military Coordinator (NMC) 
This is the principle advisor to the Civilian Administrator on military 
issues. He is put in place as the Military Governor and Civilian Administrator conduct 
their battle handover. He is the commanding officer for all combatant forces in theater 
not assigned to RDZ. He is responsible for de-conflicting, coordinating and supporting all 
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military activities within the target state. He will work closely with the National Officer 
In Charge for Civil Affairs (NOICCA) and his staff to ensure the military forces in 
theater fully support counterinsurgency and SSTR operations. He is subordinate to the 
Civilian Administrator (CA). The Civilian Administrator will resolve conflicts between 
the CA staff and the military staff.  
b. The Combatant Staff 
The military staff that overseas and supports the military activities within 
the target state. This staff works directly for the NMC and assists him in supporting the 
Civilian Administrator regarding combatant military issues. Works with the CA 
coordination staff to coordinate and de-conflict activities to avoid duplication of effort or 
interference. Combatant issues are, but not limited to, expelling main body guerilla 
forces, preventing their return, installing garrisons to protect the population and 
infrastructure, border patrol and training the national police forces.58 
c. The National Officer In Charge for Civil Affairs (NOICCA)  
The NOICCA is the principle advisor to Military Governor on Civil 
Affairs who becomes the principle advisor to the Civilian Administrator after command 
has been shifted once rapid decisive operations are concluded. The NOICCA must be an 
expert in both the military and civil actions required for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. He must be capable of managing large organizations through a diverse staff 
that includes not only military and government civilians but international organization 
and non-governmental organization civilian and military members. 
d. The National Civil Affairs Coordination Staff (NCACS)  
The NCACS is separate staff from the combatant staff that coordinates 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts and planning. The staff has both civilian and 
military members. The NCACS maintains contact and coordinates with pertinent 
governmental, international and non governmental organizations who may play roles in 
the post conflict reconstruction effort. 
e. The National Mobile Reserve (NMR) 
In addition to establishing the RDZ, upon completion of the defeat or 
expulsion of organized belligerents the military coordinator will constitute and retain a 
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national level mobile reserve, it should be in the strength and mobility of a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit or an Army Striker Brigade with reinforcing air elements. This 
reserve will be capable of reinforcing anywhere in the target nation on a moments notice. 
This reserve must be capable of conducting area denial and population control operations. 
When sent into an established RDZ the reserve commander will be subordinate to the 
RDZ Commander. The National Military Commander will however reserve the right to 
overrule the RDZ Commander if needed. Mobile forces such as this reserve will prevent 
insurgents from forming in regions where Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other 
RDZ security forces are thin. It is an economy of force measure allowing RDZ forces to 
concentrate main efforts and supporting efforts throughout the region.59 
f. The Regional Development Zone (RDZ) 
Administrative zone into which Provincial Reconstruction Teams are 
inserted, generally following pre-existing municipal boundaries, the territory size and 
population density determines the number of RDZ’s.  
(1) The Regional Military Commander (RMC). The RMC is a 
Battalion, regimental or brigade commander subordinate to the Military Governor or 
Civilian Administrator. The RMC is to be the overall commander of the RDZ. He will 
approve and is responsible for all operations civil or military in the RDZ. The size of the 
unit involved is directly related to the size of the state and region into which it is 
deployed. The composition of the unit is also dependent on the threat assessments made 
in the pre-planning phase. However, it is noted that motorized and mechanized infantry 
heavy units are best suited to these deployments. The commander must be well versed in 
the rules and regulations of martial law as well the workings of the interim government. 
Similar to the Military Governor or Civilian Administrator he must fully understand the 
policies, and principles of justice in accordance with international laws and treaties, the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the Law of Land Warfare. The commander bears 
responsibility for interim government and acts as the direct representative of this 
government and the government of the United States in the assigned region. 
The RMC and his forces will establish themselves to best support 
the stabilization and reconstruction efforts of the PRT(s) in the assigned region. The 
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disposition of the force will be set following the quadrillage et ratisage and gridding 
concepts. Quadrillage means literally to keep a region under tight police control while 
ratisage means to comb an area with military or police forces and in this scenario 
describes the mission of the intervention military force.60 Gridding is a program “in 
which the military organization follows the lines of the civil administration to make 
maximum use of all command possibilities and to permit normal administration to 
function insofar as possible.”61 It is a form of defense in depth where resource and key 
infrastructure centers in direct contact with the population become the defensive strong 
points. These positions located within the population recreate the effects of strategic 
hamlets more than isolated forts.62 The strong points however, are ineffective in and of 
themselves. Interval or mobile forces must connect these strong points or static positions 
as shown in Figures 1.63 The map symbols represent motorized infantry patrols operating 
as connecting files between the dispersed forward operating bases and static strongpoints. 
It is the mission of these mobile forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations 
throughout the assigned region. These operations include actions such as cordon and 
search, isolation missions, raids and rapid reaction, reinforcement. 
(2) The Mobile Security Forces (MSF). The mobile security forces 
mission is to provide rapid reaction, suppression, counterinsurgency and reinforcing 
forces in support of the RMC intent. This unit may require additional air and ground 
transport and should maintain its own organic fire support assets. This unit should have a 
heavy armor component available and ready access to air support. Under martial law this 
unit is authorized to enforce the rule of law in the target state. 
(3) The Static Security Force (SSF). The static security forces 
mission is to provide protection to key infrastructure and lines of communication in 
support of the RMC intent. This unit will need additional motor transport and 
surveillance equipment. These units will provide the mobile forces with detailed 
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information of the area, key personnel and sites to which they are assigned. Under martial 
law this unit is capable of enforcing the rule of law in the target state. 
(4) The Regional Officer In Charge for Civil Affairs (ROICCA). 
The ROICCA is the principle advisor to the RMC on reconstruction issues in the rank of 
Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel or Major depending on the size of the region and the units 
assigned. This position may become a civilian position as security improves.  
(5) Regional Committees for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
(RCSR). The RCSR is comprised of the RMC the ROICCA, Mobile and Static Security 
Force Commanders and the PRT Commander(s). The committee is responsible for the 
coordination and de-confliction of all SSTR operations in the RDZ. The RMC is the 
senior executive agent with the authority to overrule any deadlock. 
(6) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The mission of the 
PRT is to establish an interdisciplinary team capable of being staffed by multiple 
government agencies for SSTR operations. The ratio of civilian to military members is 
determined by the security situation. PRT’s extend the authority of the central 
government by providing interim governance and law enforcement; monitor, assess and 
report on development of regions; facilitate information sharing; contribute to the 
reconstruction process; and closely coordinate the civil-military stabilization and 
reconstruction plans including the activities and support of NGO’s.64 To be most 
effective PRT’s should be standing organizations, however this may not be possible in 
this era of limited manpower resources. PRT’s could be run in cadre or annual exercises 
could bring the various elements together. In any event the knowledge and skills needed 
to run a successful PRT and RDZ are perishable; they require continual training and 
maintenance. The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization with support, manpower and money, from the Department of Defense could 
be the repository for the knowledge, expertise and cadre of personnel to run these 
programs.65 PRT’s are purely military until the security situation is stabilized then 
civilian personnel can backfill military members. 
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Figure 1.   Infantry Battalion Regional Development Zone 
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 Figure 1. (Legend) 
 
1) Regional Development Zone Headquarters and PRT Forward Operating Base 
with Helicopter Landing Zone 
2) Electrical Power Plant SSF Strongpoint 
3) Railroad Station and Grain Storage facility SSF Strongpoint  
4) PRT Forward Operating Base (South) 
5) Fuel Oil Storage Facility SSF Strongpoint 
6) Water Treatment Facility SSF Strongpoint 
7) PRT Forward Operating Base (North) 
8) PRT Substation (South East) 
9) PRT Substation (South West) 
10) PRT Substation (North West) 
11) Water treatment station SSF Strongpoint 
12) PRT Substation (East) 
 
Note:  
1) MSF units are denoted as Infantry Company’s or Platoons: each is assigned a 
sector for operation. 
2) This construct is based on a Infantry Battalion (Motorized) of three Rifle 
Company’s and One Weapons Company Reinforced by a PRT 
3) The Infantry Battalion is further reinforced by a Tank Platoon and Mechanized 
Infantry Platoon that along with the Battalion’s Anti-Armor/Heavy machine Gun 
Platoon constitute a Rapid Reaction Force.    
 
 
(7) Commander Provincial Reconstruction Team (Cmdr PRT,) 
(Major or Lt Col). The Commander of a PRT should have specialized training in how to 
run a multi-discipline organization and in particular how to work with civilian 
organizations. 
(8) The PRT Committee. The PRT Committee is comprised of the 
PRT Commander and the OIC of each sub-team. The committee is responsible for 
coordinating and de-conflicting all SSTR operations in the PRT zone of action. The PRT 











MSF & SSF 
































MSF & SSF 

































Comm Governance  Reconstruction Medical Security  Justice 
PRT Cmdr 
Figure 4.   PRT Structure 
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g. Provincial Reconstruction Team Design (the sub-teams)  
(1) Security Team. The responsibility of the security team is to 
provide security to the PRT operation. The basic organization of the security team is 
based on a motorized or mechanized infantry company with attachments as deemed 
necessary. 
(2) Justice Team. The responsibilities of the justice team are to 
provide an interim judicial system, with the capabilities of establishing a military 
tribunal, or exceptional military court support and to train an indigenous judiciary and 
local police. Further they are to conduct a survey of the judicial infrastructure regarding 
available personnel and physical courts, prisons and police facilities. The basic 
organization of the interim justice team requires a functioning legal unit capable of 
establishing a military tribunal or exceptional court; a training and survey team; as well 
as a criminal and insurgent detention team. 
(3) Reconstruction Team. The responsibilities of the reconstruction 
team are to provide immediate humanitarian assistance support via construction or repair 
of critical infrastructure. The team must also be able to conduct a survey of future 
reconstruction needs. The basic organization of the team is formed around an engineer 
company or platoon with air transportable construction equipment and other attachments 
as deemed necessary. 
(4) Medical Team. The responsibilities of the medical team are to 
provide immediate emergency medical support to the indigenous population and the PRT 
itself. The team must be capable of conducting a survey of the regional medical needs in 
both infrastructure and personnel. The basic organization of the team is formed around a 
medical platoon with veterinary and other support as needed. 
(5) Governance and Civil Affairs Team. The responsibilities of the 
governance and civil affairs team are to provide governmental advice to the PRT 
Commander as he administers the assigned zone. Further they are to operate a Civil 
Military Operation Center (CMOC) for the coordination of civic action within the PRT 
area of operation. The team will also provide contracting and disbursing support for 
stabilization and reconstruction projects in the area of operation. Additionally this team 
will be the repository of linguists who will provide translation and interpretation support 
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to the PRT. The basic organization will be a civil affairs team reinforced as deemed 
necessary to conduct the mission. 
(6) Communications Section. The responsibilities of the 
communications section is to provide communications for the PRT and to provide a 
communication network for the indigenous leadership. The basic organization will be a 
communication section similar to that which supports detached special operations units in 
the field. 
(7) Logistics Section. The responsibilities of the logistics section 
are to provide transportation and logistics support to the PRT and to support the 
stabilization and reconstruction projects. The basic organization will be a logistics and 
motor transport section with attachments as deemed necessary to support the mission. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the discussion focused on the role and organization of the 
intervention SSTR forces in regard to the Progressive Reconstruction plan. It espoused 
the use of martial law as a tool of legitimacy and governance. It focused on the concept of 
unity of command even in these complex contingencies. It discussed command 
relationships in particular that between the Military Governor and the Civilian 
Administrator. It showed how the battle handover between these two would occur and 
discussed the purpose of this concept. It then detailed the actual organization of the SSTR 
forces. This included the hierarchy of command and the structure of the various 
organizations. The focus was on the detail of the Provincial Reconstruction Team and its 
attendant security forces that are the linchpins to a successful operation. In Chapter three 
of this thesis the discussion will move on to the implementation of Progressive 
Reconstruction during the RDO phase via a process called rapid decisive stabilization, 
and will discuss the marriage of kinetic and empathic warfare techniques. The argument 
will follow the initial action of establishing the Interim Government and the RDZ. It will 
examine momentum and initiative with a particular focus on the concept of relative 











































III. RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS AND STABILIZATION 
A commanding general of occupied territory is charged with the duty of 
maintaining peace and order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and 
property within the area of his command. His responsibility is coexistent 
with his area of command. He is charged with notice of occurrences taking 
place within that territory…dereliction of his duty rests upon him… 
 –The Nuremburg Tribunal 
The first step in Progressive Reconstruction based military intervention is the 
destruction, expulsion or separation of belligerent forces through the use of force, or 
rapid decisive operations (RDO). RDO are designed to enable “the military instrument to 
respond quickly with smaller, more lethal, forces to bring regional conflict threatening 
U.S. interest to a rapid and decisive close. Its central operational framework is a form of 
kinetic warfare—effects based operations—integrated application of precision 
engagement, information operations, theater enablers, dominant maneuver to produce a 
relentless series of multidimensional raids, strikes, and ground assaults throughout the 
battlespace. When correctly arranged in time and space, these operations attack the 
adversary in dimensions he is unable to counter, allowing U.S. forces and their allies to 
dictate the tempo and terms of any operation.”66 During this phase Progressive 
Reconstruction requires that the regional development zones (RDZ) are a supporting 
effort to the RDO. RDO forces being under the same command will however, target for 
seizure key infrastructure that will support stability operations. These will then be handed 
over to the regional military commanders (RMC) who are establishing the RDZ. During 
RDO the RMC will play the role of the traditional rear area operation coordinator or 
RAOC. As such the mission of the RMC will be to stabilize their region while facilitating 
combat operations. In addition the RMC is charged with developing the enabling force 
for future stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. 
The second step in Progressive Reconstruction is based on empathetic warfare, 
rapid decisive stabilization operations (RDS): the deploying of the Interim Military 
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Government, establishing the RDZ and enforcing the rule of law (ROL) to enable future 
SSTR operations. RDZ forces following immediately behind the RDO forces prevent a 
power vacuum and growth of lawlessness. This allows the imposition of temporary direct 
rule, facilitating the move to indirect rule and eventual independence. This juncture is 
critical to address the potential development of a small war, as “Small wars manifest 
themselves when ‘organized forces are defeated and scattered, its members may still be 
unconquered and may continue opposition through petty depredations degenerating into 
unorganized guerilla or bandit warfare.”67 Criminality and guerilla warfare operate hand-
in-hand as often the insurgents fund their military activities through crime. As a result, an 
intervention force has to enforce the ROL in occupied territory, and can do so as an 
exercise of limited sovereign like rights as discussed in Chapter II. In order for the 
intervention force commander to enforce the ROL, he must have the backing of a system 
of justice to deal with criminal non-combatants and a system of reconstruction to counter 
act subversion.  
This chapter will discuss the initial implementation of Progressive Reconstruction 
enabled by RDO. It will examine the need for unity of command and effort. It will focus 
on the need to gain and maintain momentum viewing the operation as a single action. 
This is contrary to the concept of phasing. Phasing is a linear planning tool for combat 
operations. Before discussing the integrated operation of Progressive Reconstruction it is 
necessary to identify what phases I-IV are: I) Pre-deployment; II) Deployment; III) 
Decisive; IV) Stability Operations. It is a tendency of basic human nature is to codify or 
rank activities. Unfortunately that tendency applies to this list I-IV. The sequence 
assigned to each phase, is assumed by many to be linear. In some aspects it is. Pre-
deployment planning and preparation must occur before deployment. That is simple. 
However simplistically phasing operations linearly is counterproductive and not in 
keeping with effects based operations.  
This thesis will examine how momentum was gained, lost and regained 
historically. It will discuss the concept of direct rule with emphasis on the ROL and 
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security. It will also further the discussion of martial law as a principle of SSTR. The 
laws to be followed are those of the intervened state that do not contradict international 
human rights laws and that do not prevent or interfere with the conduct of military 
actions. The right to enforce these laws is held under the interim government and the 
obligation is held under international law and custom. Further it will examine the paradox 
that exists wherein the first months of an intervention the U.S. military is the most 
capable and best equipped force for the mission yet it is the force most reluctant to 
undertake it.68  
 
A. UNITY OF COMMAND  
Unity of command is required to ensure unity of effort for every objective. Both 
combat and post combat operations to be effective must be under one responsible 
commander. A single commander will ensure that all efforts will be directed and 
coordinated towards a common goal. Coordination is best achieved by vesting a single 
commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a 
common goal. The commander should be selected on the basis of experience, a strong 
will and dominating personality. He must be able to counteract fitful interagency 
coordination issues. For example, if a department is at odds with itself the department 
head can break the impasse.69 But only the commander stands over them all. The 
argument stands for their only being one in charge.  
The basic difficulty of traditional SSTR operations such as those run by the UN is 
their dual chain of authority for field operations. Military officers are in charge of 
operations but civilians are in charge of logistics and budgets.70 These UN forces tend to 
be woefully inadequate to the task of providing for public order as they struggle with 
neutrality and impartiality, both unrealistic aspirations in a war zone. In both the Congo 
ONUC and Cambodia UNTAC operations the UN forces suffered from a lack of unity of 
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command and effort. The military answered to far too many outside forces and could not 
successfully synergize efforts to achieve the common goals and achieve a rapid decisive 
end state. ONUC had to, by default as the former Belgian administrators fled and the 
Congolese government failed, take over many of the tasks of governance including the 
task of forcibly suppressing the Katangan revolt.71 UNTAC was mandated to manage the 
government but was not prepared to be as involved as needed as this following statement 
demonstrates: 
UNTAC suffered from a lack of planning and coordination ‘No substantial 
planning had taken place in anticipation and, other than on the initiative of 
some contributing countries, no contingents had been earmarked for the 
operation [Within UNTAC] there never was any strategic planning…In 
the early stages of the transitional period, such dilatory planning and 
ambiguity about timetables made ‘reluctant cooperation’ from the parties, 
especially from the Khmer Rouge, a rational response. 
 — Sorpong Peou72  
Commanders need the authority and resources to implement interim governance 
and control all activities civil and military. They must have the capacity to manage 
finances and control the flow of aid in their area of operation. The force would provide 
social services to the people demonstrating support capacity visibly beneficial to the 
population at large. The force must be capable of mobilizing the population, actively 
involving as many as possible in the reconstruction effort giving them belief in the new 
cause. Without a unified effort subordinated to a single commander the SSTR operation 
will suffer indecision, duplication of effort and overwhelming complication. 
 
B. MOMENTUM 
All our recent conquest…developed through two phases: that of the initial 
war, with the winning of apparently decisive victories, followed by that of 
insurrection, inevitable painful, and of which the issue was more 
administrative than military, the organization of the country. 
 — E.F. Gautier, Morocco 1910. 
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RDO represent the immediate measures, the entry and enabling force actions that 
set the stage for long term sustained activity. The immediacy of the crisis that generally 
precedes intervention tends to overshadow the inevitable long-term programs that must 
follow. The ultimate success of an intervention can only be determined through the 
dangerous and slow progressive transition to democracy and a stable peace.73 Yet despite 
this long term nature it is often thought that interventions are won and lost in the first 
months. The longer it takes to implement security during an intervention the less chance 
the intervention has of success as with each passing day the people become more and 
more susceptible to subversion.74 For the intervention force in SSTR as in regular combat 
gaining and maintaining momentum is critical throughout.75 The sooner the intervention 
force can insert its interim government, gaining relative superiority, a decisive advantage 
over anti-government forces, the better the situation will be. However gaining and 
maintaining this relative superiority is extremely difficult.   
Relative superiority is a concept originally intended to discuss special operations 
however; it is useful in SSTR operations as well.76 How to gain and maintain a 
continuous and sustained effort, maintaining relative superiority, throughout an 
intervention has been a subject that has perplexed practitioners for centuries. The ‘how 
to’ maintenance of the impulsion of unified effort has been the subject of many different 
discourses.77 The longer an operation, the more difficult it becomes to maintain relative 
superiority. Once lost, momentum can be regained but it becomes increasingly difficult to 
do so.78 As SSTR operations are necessarily long-term, momentum building will be of 
the utmost importance. To facilitate the effort initiative must be seized as quickly as 
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possible. The initial tactical SSTR operations should focus on highly visible short-term 
efforts supplemented by intense advertising of longer-term efforts to come.  
When democratic states intervene, they seek to secure the population, promote the 
rule of law, and build self-sustaining institutions as quickly as possible. The literature on 
conflict resolution agrees that the longer it takes to establish a stable and effective 
government the more the people suffer.79 When external actors compel change, those 
actors such as the United States, must be capable of taking over the roles of the 
government without delay.80 SSTR operations must match the rapidity of action that 
combat operations exert. This tempo is imperative to maintain momentum and build upon 
initial relative superiority. Unfortunately, there is currently no methodology as to how to 
accomplish this comprehensive state building.81 Francis Fukuyama states that the 
problem with current systems of transition and reconstruction is that they do not know 
how to transfer institutional capacity and lack long-term plans.82 The current methods 
rely on ad hoc groupings of military, government and private players generally incapable 
of forging the necessary organization.83 None of these activities currently are designed 
for rapid deployment or implementation. 
1. Losing Momentum 
One of the best examples of the loss of momentum in an intervention is the ill-
fated UN operation Restore Hope. In this unprecedented action the U.S. played the role 
of an enabling force. Somalia was a country without a government whose people lacked 
the basic food and medical supplies to survive. Prior to the intervention the supplies 
could only be brought in via a loose network of NGO’s and warlord run militias.84 This 
Byzantine network was extremely corrupt and inefficient. The arrival of U.S. forces 
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international community to establish true law and order, and most likely would have 
required a hands-on, direct rule approach. However, this opportunity was wasted and the 
local bandit leaders used it to their advantage correctly reading the limited intentions of 
the U.S. forces and forming plans to exploit the situation. Once they realized the 
international force was not going to enforce basic law and order or enforce peace, opting 
on a strict food delivery operation only, the warlords began flexing their muscle.  
The U.S. mandate did not include the creation or implementation of a new 
government.85 This, it was argued, would have required far too much involvement. As a 
result looting became rampant; exploitation of the foreign intervention became the goal 
of the warlords. Making matters worse peace deals where brokered with the warlords, 
giving them de facto legitimacy and ignoring the will of the average people, and the rural 
population. Corners where cut to speed the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The design of the 
interim Somali government, basically an amalgam of warlords, was fatally flawed, the 
time invested in it was inadequate and demonstrated the lack of true commitment to 
rebuilding the Somali state.86 The momentum gained in the initial landing of foreign 
troops was quickly lost and eventually exploited by the local warring factions. From that 
point on the various UN and U.S. forces where playing catch up trying vainly to regain 
the initiative garnered by the relative superiority of the initial actions. Had the planners of 
Restore Hope followed the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine beyond merely the initial 
enabling and follow on withdrawal phases the operation would have had the capability 
for success. 
2. Reopening Windows 
In state building efforts that involve counterinsurgency operations there are times 
when momentum is lost and the insurgents gain the upper hand. When this occurs the 
window of opportunity can be considered closed or relative superiority lost. In this 
eventuality a modified RDO-RDS enabling operation can be launched in order to reclaim 
the initiative, to reopen the window. The keys to this effort are isolation, organization and  
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unified command and control. Historically these reclamation projects have been 
successful to varying degrees in the Greek Civil War; the Philippine Huk Rebellion and 
the Malayan Emergency.  
At the outset of the Greek Civil War, 1946-1949, the security forces and the 
British Army that supported them were not organized, equipped or trained to fight a 
counterinsurgency campaign.87 By 1947 the insurgency was growing rapidly and the 
competing and disorganized Greek government agencies were not up to the task of 
defeating it. This same year the United States under the Truman Doctrine stepped in, 
replacing the British forces. U.S. military aid and military advisers quickly flooded the 
country raising the skill and professionalism of the armed forces dramatically.88 
However, the U.S. trained and equipped Greeks remained unable to crush the guerillas. 
The preferred tactic was large-scale inefficient search-and-destroy missions that were not 
tied to political, economic and humanitarian efforts.89 Frustrated with the lack of results 
gained from the heavy investment, the Greeks began to experiment with smaller scale 
isolation operations that included such activity as temporary relocation of non-combatant 
populations. Further, they appointed General Papagos as the new commander-in-chief. 
General Papagos, a famous and respected war hero, accepted the job under the condition 
that he be allowed complete and solitary command. This had the effect of reducing 
bureaucratic and political interference in field operations.90 The results were felt 
immediately; the guerilla forces hard pressed by well organized and coordinated 
government forces began resorting to greater and greater acts of violence and terrorism 
angering the general populace. This anger and the increased professional and dedicated 
efforts of the security forces isolated the guerillas, and in conjunction with proactive 
diplomatic and political actions broke the insurgency.  
The Philippine Huk Rebellion, 1945-1953, started along similar lines. The 
guerilla forces began exploiting the turmoil in government at the end of WWII in order to 
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rectify real and perceived grievances.91 At the outset it was estimated that ten percent of 
the population supported the Huks; ten percent did not and eighty percent where 
neutral.92 This neutral majority was exploited, both willingly and unwillingly, by the Huk 
into providing food, clothing, shelter, security and information to the guerillas. The Huk 
fully understood that every action they took provoked a reaction from this target group, 
the government forces did not. As in Greece, the state security forces were woefully 
under-prepared to face this type of warfare. They were poorly trained, ill disciplined, few 
in number and best at providing static defenses.93 They tended to resort to extreme 
violence and intrusive tactics when frustrated by the more agile guerilla forces. The U.S., 
recognizing the danger immediately, began funneling military aid and advisors into the 
Philippines. The Philippine security forces benefited greatly but made the same mistake 
as the Greeks by initiating large scale search-and-destroy operations. Again these served 
to little effect except to anger the neutral population. Surprise was absolutely necessary 
for these operations to succeed yet it was impossible to achieve with such large troop 
movements. Further many of the tactics such as free fire zones and recon by fire only 
caused pain for the peasantry. More sophisticated tactics were sought.  
By 1950 the Philippine Army and Police Forces began operating small patrols, 
extending the presence of the government to the village level.94 They roamed far and 
wide establishing mobile checkpoints, and generally focusing on disrupting guerilla 
communications. Further they developed infiltration units or “psuedo-huk” that could 
operate in insurgent territory gaining vast amounts of actionable intelligence.95 The 
ability to exploit this newfound initiative and verve came from the appointment of 
Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of National Defense.  
Magsaysay like General Papagos was a strong, independent operator who 
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twelve different organizations competitively collecting intelligence on Huk activities. 
These efforts were not coordinated and the information gained was not readily shared.  
After his appointment Magsaysay forced the issue, streamlined these activities and 
focused the overall effort. The major aim of all civ-mil activities was now to win civil 
cooperation. To this end he restructured an old and often dreaded Army tactic called the 
zona into a less invasive version of isolation and intelligence gathering.96 Individual 
regions or zones were isolated by the military but not as a search-and-destroy mission. 
The mission ensured positive interrogation of the population while insuring individual 
privacy and reinforcing the concept of positive government sponsored stability and 
security.  The patrolling of small mobile units became constant and aggressively 
reinforced the security provided by the central government.97 Further generous amnesty 
programs were offered in order to bring guerillas in peacefully. The revised programs 
were so effective that eighteen months after Magsaysay took charge the insurgency was 
broken.98 
The Malayan Emergency was of far greater magnitude than the previous two, 
however, the concept for prosecution was the same. Post WWII a Chinese backed 
communist rebellion took root in Malaya lasting from 1948 to 1960. Once again a sub-
national group bent on overthrowing the existing government exploited the turmoil of 
WWII.99 In this case the government was a colonial Governorate of Great Britain, though 
independence was promised in the future. As with both Greece and the Philippines the 
security forces of the state, including British and Commonwealth troops, were not 
properly organized, prepared or sufficiently large enough to prevent the insurgents from 
establishing substantial guerilla bases throughout the country. In addition, the British 
Malayan government was slow to respond to the growing threat. However, they did 
declare a State of Emergency that gave the security force powers similar to Martial Law. 
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The British counterinsurgency program was best articulated by Sir Henry Briggs 
in what came to be known as the Brigg’s Plan.100 This plan consisted of the following 
tenets: 
(1) To dominate the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security 
which would, in time, result in a steady and increasing flow of information from 
all sources. 
(2) To break the Communist organizations within the populated areas. 
(3) To isolate the guerillas from the food and supply organizations in the populated 
areas.  
(4) To destroy the guerillas by forcing them to attack the security forces on their own 
ground. 
Actions taken under this plan involved resettlement to strategic hamlets, 
relocating over five hundred thousand people by 1953, identification card systems and 
cordon and search operations. They had the right to impose curfews and issue severe 
penalties for aiding the insurgency. Yet the authority to implement these actions did not 
end the war. 
Unfortunately, the British military began the war as had the other government 
forces, concentrating upon large scale operations, grand sweeping actions attempting to 
scour the jungles for guerillas. These activities met with the same limited success, wasted 
manpower and resources as had the Greek and Philippine operations. The British 
eventually learned the same lesson that only small, mobile, self-sufficient patrols, capable 
of surviving on their own over long periods of time could effectively hunt and kill the 
guerillas.101 Further, these actions had to be tied to civilian political and economic 
activity and be subordinate to the overall campaign plan that answered to a single unified 
command. 
Ultimately it took a strong personality to wield the authority and meld the 
disparate civ-mil organizations of state and security into one cohesive force capable of 
defeating the insurgency. This strength was brought to Malaya in the person of General 
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Sir Gerald Templar. Templar was a dynamic, unconventional character with immense 
energy who understood clearly the mission at hand. His famous quote “The battle for the 
hearts and minds of the people” has summarized his concept of stability operations. He 
realized that his job was to implement the solid plans and organizational strategies laid 
out by his predecessors that had just not been followed through in a forceful coherent 
manner. One of his tactics was to remove the State of Emergency by regions.102 When a 
region was deemed close to secure he would focus on it, ramping up the security 
measures and security force presence for a brief period then backing off and declaring the 
region “white” or free from insurgents. The region would then be freed from the heavy 
restriction of the Emergency as a reward. Additionally, the counterinsurgents offered 
amnesty, monetary rewards and re-training to any guerilla willing to surrender. This 
proved highly useful at garnering information on other insurgents. 
What these three examples demonstrate is that even when the initial window of 
opportunity to prevent the violence is missed, through lack of understanding of the threat, 
negligence or unprepared security forces, the initiative can be regained through resolute 
action. The actions most commonly effective: isolation of the insurgents from the general 
population; deployment of a coherent, tailored counterinsurgency organization; and unity 
of command designed to focus all the power of the central government on the problem at 
hand.  
Following this logic, Progressive Reconstruction can be used to stabilize regions 
of instability in a preexisting guerilla war through the employment of combined RDO-
RDS in a surgical manner. An unstable province can be targeted for isolation and 
infiltration and domination by government forces. These forces operating under Martial 
Law would exercise all the restrictive controls necessary to protect the people and 
infrastructure of the RDZ.  The application of these restrictive measures, while onerous, 
if well organized with a clear, disciplined and coherent multi-faceted mission and 
command structure, such as the RDZ, will be able to secure the population and deny the 
insurgents the foothold they desire.  
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C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RDZ: RAPID DECISIVE STABILIZATION 
In Haiti, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo... no district…was pacified by 
military means alone. 
 — Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, 1950.  
Progressive Reconstruction’s operational concept is the rapid establishment of 
stability following in trace of a military action in order to facilitate long-term SSTR 
operations. It requires the placing of a specially designed and organized force in the 
newly liberated areas on the heels of decisive military actions. The targeted areas must 
include strategic economic sites, transportation lines, population centers, medical, 
sanitation, subsistence, and communication nodes. Post war recovery will depend on the 
economically important road and rail networks, airports and communications facilities. 
These are facilities that will be targeted and possibly destroyed by RDO forces and local 
defenders during combat.103 The RMC will be charged with conducting triage on this 
infrastructure to ensure the humanitarian impact is minimized and crisis averted.  
1. Enabling Force 
Rapid deployment of RDZ forces behind RDO forces would provide for relative 
superiority allowing the SSTR operation to set up while they have the initiative. These 
units as discussed are specially designed to provide the initial stability and organization 
for sustained operations to maintain the momentum. Failure to quickly implement 
competent interim governmental control via military force in the wake of direct 
intervention may cause civil war, anarchy, and chaos. The intervention force cannot 
assume that the previous local government will function in any capacity during post 
conflict. “These places typically have no revenue systems, no public funds; no way 
anybody at any level of governance can do anything right away.”104 While Barton is 
exaggerating for effect in this quote, it is understood that a regime change will collapse 
the previous government and in a failed state where the government is broken, a vacuum 
of governance will exist requiring foreign intervention forces to fill this role in the 
interim. The design of Progressive Reconstruction and a specially organized unit 
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providing this effort parallels current military thought on forcible entry forces as initial 
enabling forces. In this case it would be an enabling force for state building. 
Progressive Reconstruction as an enabling system is designed to defeat insurgent 
forces quickly and decisively before they can take root and begin to expand thereby 
gaining relative superiority. It is worth noting that all insurgencies regardless of the 
support they have from outside organizations or states are local. The issues that motivate 
the average insurgent recruit are issues born and bred in localized conditions. 
International or trans-national support from outside the target state can be defeated by 
removing local issues as well.  It is hard to stir resentment amongst hard working well-
compensated peoples. A first step towards gaining relative superiority in counter-
insurgency must be visible and rapid remedying of local ills. Attacking the unstable 
political situation at the local level once initial combat operations have moved on will 
assist the intervention forces with the gaining of popular support. Progressive 
Reconstruction accomplishes this by protecting the population and isolating them from 
the potential insurgents through the immediate emplacement of an organization, the RDZ 
and PRT, which enforces governance, the ROL and security.  
We must assume that regardless of the U.S. intentions for intervention, insurgents 
will find fertile grounds for recruitment by exploiting the mere presence of foreigners. 
Altruism will not be understood as a motive for intervention. What will be understood are 
immediate visible benefits and strong military presence enforcing the ROL. After the 
initial assault and combat has achieved local victory and the RDO forces prepare to move 
on to the next objective the Progressive Reconstruction forces move in and begin to 
repair damage, provide security and subsistence. They must foster good will and working 
relationships with the local population in order to develop the safety net of intelligence 
that will be necessary for counter-insurgency operations in the future. 
2. Direct Rule  
Because we would have destroyed the political order…Conquered Iraqis 
would turn to the U.S. government for emergency relief, civil order, 
economic reconstruction, and protection of their borders.105 
 — James Fallows, 2002. 
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In the initial action of a Progressive Reconstruction operation the indigenous 
government must be assumed to be nonexistent, failed or failing. According to Hans 
Binnedijk the U.S. military action will fracture the already weak state structure.106 The 
military force must be prepared to establish an Interim Military Government and exercise 
direct rule.107 The purpose of direct rule is to protect the indigenous population by 
providing for them while they recover from the immediate effects of war. It will also 
provide a buffer separating the various ethnic sub-national entities, preventing any one 
group from assuming dominance.108 Once secure and stabilized the indigenous people 
can set about their own recovery. Establishing direct rule will include the insertion of 
security forces and PRT’s. These forces will protect infrastructure and conduct basic 
governmental functions. Law enforcement and judicial action, particularly anti-looting 
and curfew operations will be principle activities. It is fostered by the set up of static 
security forces that will protect infrastructure, individuals and institutions while mobile 
forces prosecute the insurgents more directly. Key leaders and institutions that begin 
working for the intervention forces will be in need of particular protection as subversives 
and insurgents will target the more visible collaboration projects. Protection must be 
provided to critical nodes such as natural resources, civil registries, power, water, and 
fuel facilities. Further protection must be extended to military facilities and hardware as 
well as public institutions, government buildings, museums, communications centers, and 
courthouses.  
The concept of Direct Rule in this case is the undertaking of day-to-day 
governance, law enforcement and security of the target state by the intervening military 
force. In this manner the Progressive Reconstruction forces follow more closely than the 
RDO forces the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. The organization and planning involved 
here is particularly designed for establishing momentum, maintaining and sustaining this 
momentum and transitioning the target state, weaning it from foreign support. The 
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as much as possible success. Success is achieved through the long term creation of a 
stable peace. The forces involved could be one man or a hundred thousand. The focus is 
not on numbers but on the appropriate force tailored for the mission. It just happens that 
SSTR missions tend to be manpower intensive in ways RDO with precision kinetic 
technologies are not. In order to implement direct rule the enabling force would have to 
be robust. This force is justified as direct rule sets the stage for integrating indigenous 
personnel, establishing a regime based on more indirect rule and transitioning to 
independence in an orderly progressive fashion. 
3. Establishing the Rule of Law: Martial Law and the Issuance of 
Supplemental Regulations 
Law enforcement must be a priority in an intervention. The laws will be laid out 
in the Proclamation of Interim Military Government and its supplemental regulations. 
This is done in conjunction with the commencement of the intervention. As the 
belligerent armed forces are being destroyed or expelled from the targeted area of 
operations the designated RMC deploys his RDZ team and commences ROL operations. 
The more rapid the destruction and expulsion of the enemy main force the greater the 
need to rapidly deploy the stabilization forces.109 The rapid deployment of stabilization 
forces will prevent the power vacuum in which criminal, guerilla and insurgent forces 
thrive. Timing is everything, if there is a moments hesitation criminals will exploit it. 
The principle measure to ensure the ROL is the declaration of martial law and the 
issuance of supplemental regulations. Martial law authorizes the intervening military 
force to actively enforce the law. Martial law in this case is somewhat different than that 
which has historically been in play. Here martial law is used to support the activities of 
an interim government. Whereas historically interim government assumed the role of a 
real government exercised by a military or civilian governor over inhabitants of an enemy 
country as a result of war and martial law was intended to be an exercise of military 
authority over a states own population.110 In Progressive Reconstruction martial law is 
seen as the tool of the interim government which authorizes it to enforce the law via the 
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intervention military force in order to maintain order. Martial law can be declared and 
rescinded and when necessary declared again, while the interim government is permanent 
only ending when the indigenous government is capable of standing alone. 
The interim government issues the order for martial law as the first step in 
providing security in the newly occupied territory. It uses martial law and the subsequent 
supplemental orders to establish the legitimacy of the interim regime. The proclamation 
and supplemental orders establish the rules on internal movement, and regulates air and 
overland movement. It establishes an identification regime including the issuance of 
documents, personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, 
birth certificates and drivers’ licenses. All these forms of control will be vital to 
suppressing potential insurgents. A force able to implement these programs quickly will 
be given differential treatment. The neutral majority of the population will comply 
leaving the potential insurgents without support and protection. 
The proclamation will address the disposition in regard to the retention, paying 
off, or dissolution of the previous regime military, law enforcement and civil services. As 
such it can be used to engage indigenous forces capable of promoting immediate 
stability.111 It can implement a plan for the future disposition of indigenous armed forces 
and intelligence services regarding their potential for rehire in the new constabulary 
force. It will also ensure the immediate health, provisions, and security for former 
belligerents.112 Programs such as these will give former combatants a known mechanism 
for support and will help garner their cooperation. The proclamation also introduces a 
design for a former belligerent reintegration strategy. It provides a structure for future 
employment, pensions and other material support for demobilized forces. Further, the 
proclamation identifies future roles, mission and structure of security forces, and sets the 
stage for the PRT to begin vetting potential officers and other individuals.113 Here the  
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concept of temporary direct rule will allow local level initiatives to take root as the 
foreign intervention forces will sideline potential warlords and criminal bosses who will 
not be able to exploit the weak. 
Martial law and interim military policing involves basic law enforcement as well 
as establishing border security including customs to prevent arms and other contraband 
from entering or exiting the target state. It covers the protection of vulnerable elements of 
society including women, children and other minorities. It is designed to ensure the flow 
of humanitarian aid to the needy. The declaration of martial law allows the intervention 
military forces to perform civilian police functions, including crime investigation and 
criminal incarceration. It also covers crowd control, prevention of looting, and 
management of civil disturbances. As martial law is implemented the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams establish themselves and begin an initial infrastructure and 
security survey. The survey involves a quick review of available resources and the results 
should be compared to the pre-intervention intelligence. Establishing security and the 
ROL will be principle efforts of the interim government and martial law is the 
mechanism through which it will be achieved. 
 
D. THE TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY, FROM DIRECT TO 
INDIRECT RULE 
Indirect rule is rule through the native natural hierarchy, in other words the people 
must choose their own leadership while the intervention force provides support via 
financing, equipment and expertise.114 Coordination is required both within the U.S. 
government and through the interagency process and among actors in the field to ensure a 
smooth transition from direct to indirect rule. These actors include international 
organizations regional alliances, NGO and indigenous personnel. As already stated, the 
forcible occupation of a country brings with it the responsibility for all the government 
functions of that country yet the military force cannot do this work alone for long.  Local 
and international personnel must be brought to bear to work together in an organized 
manner to ensure these services are provided. As soon as the security situation allows and 
in accordance with a solid pre-designed plan civilian agencies must be brought in and 
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stood up in support of the overall operation. The transition from military to civilian to 
indigenous control must be seamless. The best way to make this transition is to empower 
and employ indigenous personnel alongside foreign experts and administrators organized 
and subordinate to a central coordinating organization. 
Indigenous state apparatus must be fully funded for successful implementation. 
Payment of salaries for indigenous service providers and granting contracts locally will 
reinforce the desire of the locals to work with the U.S. and Coalition forces. The regional 
military commander (RMC) needs to prioritize and coordinate a consistent and reliable 
work program that encompasses the entire RDZ. The foundation for this program must be 
emplaced immediately and followed through into the sustained programs of stabilization 
and reconstruction covered in Chapter IV. Delays in action and implementation only 
make it harder as seen in this quote from Afghanistan “the failure to quickly fund and 
follow through on the priorities outlined at the Tokyo donors’ conference led to a 
weakening of the central government that will extend the need for international 
involvement for years and decrease the intervention’s likelihood of success.”—Robert 
Orr. 115 Transition is always a dangerous event, but the stronger the foundation built by 
rapid decisive stabilization the smoother it will be. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Rapid decisive stabilization working hand and hand with RDO provides the 
enabling framework for future success. Effective use of the direct rule concept and 
martial law to ensure the rule of law will provide the structure to protect transition and 
maintain momentum. The indirect approach is a necessary outreach program to prevent 
miss and over use of the military and follow on civilian SSTR forces and to involve the 
indigenous people in their own recovery. The Military Governor as the commander of the 
intervention and the first administrator of the occupied territory designs, implements, and 
executes the operation; ultimately ensuring a successful battle handover. The Military 
Governor is the linchpin that ensures a consistent and coordinated effort across the target 
state, keeping interagency issues from stymieing the operation. 
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This interagency process has caused great difficulties in the past and needs 
reform. As can be seen in Iraq today the U.S. struggles with bureaucratic red tape to 
establish PRT’s across the country. Department of State and Defense are seemingly 
unwilling or unable to work together towards this common goal. In the end the 
implementation suffers delays that just may not be recoverable.116 The opportunity to 
regain relative superiority that the insertion of well organized multi-agency PRT’s 
provided was and is entirely time based and fleeting. The U.S. cannot exert leadership if 
it has not thought through its own strategy.117 The strategy has changed as the compelling 
rationale of intervention has shifted from keeping others from fighting to the prevention 
of the spread of terrorism, terrorist havens and WMD proliferation. The stated U.S. 
mechanism for change is to foster the growth of democracy.118 Following this democratic 
mandate the next step has been forcible regime change in failed, failing and rogue states. 
Progressive Reconstruction in the context of forcible intervention aims to establish 
democracy through transitional political authority.119 The Military governor and the 
Civilian Administrator as the direct representative of the President of the United States 
and or the International Community has the power and the authority to enforce 
compliance amongst the various agencies and to generate synergistic efforts. 
During the transitions from military intervention to direct then indirect and 
independent rule, governance must continue without pause this includes the provision of 
basic services. The focus here is on transitioning command from military to civilian and 
from direct to indirect rule. These transitions affect each level of the intervention. The 
Military Governor and the Civilian Administrator conduct their battle hand over once 
security is established and as each RDZ stands up. Unity of command and unity of effort 
are maintained by transferring all the powers of the Military Governor to the Civilian 
Administrator. As the security situation improves civilian team members who have been 
fully integrated with the plan since the outset begin to take over for military PRT 
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members. Indigenous personnel are recruited, vetted and brought into the PRT 
organization and rule begins to evolve from direct to indirect.120 Every effort must be 
made to ensure momentum is not lost as RDO and its associated stabilization mission 
transition to sustained operations. 
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IV. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE 
There is a vast amount of information on conflict resolution in the developing 
world, mostly focusing on ending civil wars where power-sharing arrangements can be 
brokered.121 However, these strategies tend to fall short when applied to the ever-
increasing problem of failed and rogue states in which no basis for power sharing can be 
had.122 In the case of a rogue state, like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, were the regime is 
forcibly changed by outside intervention there can be no deal with the former 
government. In a failed state, a state like Somalia with no legitimate government, great 
care must be taken not to grant power to sub-national entities.123 When a government 
fails, criminal gangs, warlords and international terrorist seek to exploit lax policing, 
public discontent, and black market opportunities. The activities of these groups — 
narcotic and human trafficking as well as terrorism — are harmful in and out of their 
borders. Since most of the borders in the third world are poorly policed, it is difficult to 
isolate these activities in individual countries. Conflicts left unchecked spread rapidly to 
affect entire regions.124 A prime example of this regional affect is the conflict in Liberia 
which spread to Sierra Leone, via the Liberian President Charles Taylor’s sponsorship of 
the Revolutionary United Front.125  
Unfortunately, many programs designed to end civil wars without clear and 
enforceable mandates tend to prolong the conflicts because they fail to impose peace on 
the warring factions.126 Robert Hope Franklin clearly demonstrates this fact in his 
outstanding work Reconstruction after the Civil War in which he shows how even with 
military victory the legislated changes—13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the 
Constitution—will fail if there is no means or will to enforce the mandates. Here white 
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southerners where able to circumvent the new equal rights legislation through a 
combination of political and subversive activities. Ultimately the preservation of the 
Union took precedence over the rights of the black minority. The sub-national elite was 
able to exploit this fact and keep the African American population in the south 
subordinate until the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s.  
This inability to enforce mandates is also true in many of the UN sponsored 
interventions, as can be witnessed by the current operation in The Democratic Republic 
of Congo and was also true of the 1960’s Congo operation. These programs are generally 
cobbled together from disparate forces and lack international will to decisively end 
conflict. As a result of the lack of decisiveness, conflict is often prolonged.127 These 
interventions typically seek to relieve human suffering caused by civil war with the 
provision of humanitarian aid and placement of neutral peacekeeping forces between 
warring factions to enforce ceasefires.  
These interventions commonly fail to address the underlying problem of war. By 
allowing belligerents to stay armed and active the ability of the people to form and 
strengthen political authority with grass roots support from local and regional levels is 
retarded. Undefeated factions retain too much power and rarely relinquish the monopoly 
of violence to the fledgling state. Again in the case of Liberia, the intervention of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was improvised, involved 
direct conflict with the warring parties and failed to impose a lasting peace.128  
In most cases secluded regions, areas not easily accessible are often left 
ungoverned and or unprotected while cities become collection points for internally 
displaced people and refugees overwhelming their meager resources. In these cases the 
potential for a return to or continuation of conflict is very high.129 If and when criminal 
and subversive elements within these regions test peacekeeping forces to determine their 
resolve, as in the cases of Rwanda in 1994, and Sierra Leone in 1999, a reversion to 
                                                 
127 Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention” in Pamela Aall, et al. (eds.) 285-294: 289 
128 Stephen John Stedman, Ending Civil Wars, the Implementation of Peace Agreements, (Reinner, 
Colorado 2002.), 37 
129 Edward N. Luttwak, “The Curse of Inconclusive Intervention,” in Pamela Aall et al. (eds.) 264-
283: 265 
60 
violence is nearly assured.130 Only in Cambodia where the UN was given control of the 
nation’s ministries of foreign affairs, defense, security and information was a reversion to 
violence avoided.131 However, the desired end state of establishing a viable democracy 
has fallen short jeopardizing the stable peace. 
Cessation of conflict is only the first step toward building a lasting peace once 
conflict ends reconstruction of the state must begin.132 This goal should be the unifying 
objective clearly articulated by both military and civilian planners.133 SSTR operations 
encompass the military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace 
to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.134 SSTR represent the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s activities that support U.S. Government plans, which lead 
to sustainable peace while advancing American interests.135 According to the Department 
of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 28 November 2005, military support to SSTR 
establishing a sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests is the basis for 
intervention. Therefore to the United States the objective of intervention is to achieve a 
sustainable peace; a clearly non-kinetic warfighting activity.  
Sustainable peace is the decisive turning point where the target state is capable of 
providing its own security, maintaining the rule of law, and exercising free and 
independent democratic governance without extensive external military and civilian 
support. As described by the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan: 
Domestic peace has typically been most sustainable when it has gone 
beyond a stable truce or the mere capacity to deter armed rebellion. 
Successful cases have often included reformed systems of governance that 
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are responsive to people’s basic needs at the local, regional, and national 
levels. Sustainable development is indispensable to such a peace.136 
The concept of sustainable peace goes beyond what some conflict resolution 
theorists believe to be possible as great powers generally lack the will to invest heavily in 
these operations.137 It is not always clear in the first instance when it is in the national 
interest to conduct SSTR operations. Without defined national objectives and strong 
domestic support, risking lives and treasure may not be acceptable at the outset and will 
be difficult to sustain over time.138 Intervention without full commitment may lead to a 
premature withdrawal and return to violence. Leaders contemplating forcible 




Stabilization is the effort to create a secure and stable environment and to provide 
for the basic rule of law. The measures of effectiveness for a stable security situation are 
(1) the establishment of the rule of law through a competent police, corrections and 
judicial system; (2) the emplacement of an efficient civil service and professional 
bureaucracy; and (3) the establishment of a professional and disciplined security force 
accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.139 The intent is to provide rule of law 
(ROL) for the affected region allowing the target state and intervention forces to develop 
and deploy the organizations necessary for long-term security and stability. It is further 
intended to utilize the security created by rapid decisive operations (RDO) and the 
transition from direct to indirect rule to allow for the growth of an indigenous 
government. A key to this operation is maintaining and sustaining a secure environment 
for growth. Stability operations to this end focus on counter-subversion and insurrection 
operations.  
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1. Counter-Subversion, Insurgency and Criminal Operations 
In Progressive Reconstruction security is established through counterinsurgency 
operations and the suppression of subversive and criminal elements. The method by 
which this is accomplished is by placing PRT’s in each region throughout the target 
country as discussed in Chapter III, RDO. This is a variation of the old technique of tache 
d‘huille.140 In this technique, as espoused by the French, control is established gradually 
by infiltrating columns of troops and special administrative organizations into outlying 
regions. This is done to eliminate subversive support systems before they take root. The 
presence of government forces and administrators providing basic services defeats the 
symbiotic relationship between the people and the insurgent’s over time. In Progressive 
Reconstruction the installation of government control via military forces and specially 
organized administrative organizations is done at the very outset of the intervention. 
Initially, the goal is to provide stability through direct rule eventually shifting to indirect 
with the ultimate goal of an independent, self-determined democracy. The variation here 
is that the implementation is contiguous with the initial military and police actions. 
The military and police actions most prominent in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations deal with insurgency and subversion.  It is important then to this discussion to 
define both subversion and insurgency. In his classic work on counterinsurgency, titled 
Low Intensity Operations, Frank Kitson defines these two activities as they relate to 
stability operations:  
Subversion is all illegal measures short of the use of armed force taken by 
one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the 
country at the time, or to force them to do things, which they do not want 
to do. It can involve the use of political and economic pressure, strikes, 
protests, marches, and propaganda, and can also include the use of small-
scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the 
population into giving support. Insurgency is held to cover the use of 
armed force by a section of the people against the government for the 
purposes mentioned above. These activities can occur at the same time in 
the same country. 
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In Progressive Reconstruction, the PRT is the focal point for counterinsurgency 
operations. By placing military security forces throughout the target state, including the 
most remote sections of the country, the government can win the confidence of the 
people. The people, with reduced fear of retribution, will in turn participate in governance 
and provide information on potential insurgents. The close PRT relationship with the 
indigenous population will assist in the gathering of intelligence. The forces within and 
supporting the PRT can enforce the necessary movement controls and conduct the 
extensive patrolling needed to stabilize the region through the provision of security and 
ROL.141  
Pre-empting guerilla or insurgent force formation requires targeting what at one 
time was called the ‘foco’ or the insurgent leadership. Immediately after the initial 
deployment the Progressive Reconstruction forces begin attacking the sources of guerrilla 
power—their influence on the population at large. Counterinsurgency focuses on 
isolation of subversives and the potential insurgents from the general populace. Stress 
would be placed on political activities such as: dissemination of information through 
local level town meetings, passing out pre-written regulations, media broadcasts, while 
the regional military commander (RMC) coordinates the policy for the region. The PRT 
begins by recruiting and vetting cadres of indigenous personnel for employment in local 
and national level judicial and police systems. In cases where there exists a partisan force, 
such as the Kurdish Pesh Merga or Afghan Northern Alliance, these armed fighters must 
be honored for their efforts and sacrifices. They must also be subsumed into the national 
forces and or be demobilized. They cannot remain as an independent force outside of 
governmental control. These warriors can form the backbone of a national police force or 
if left without pensions, without honors for dedicated service, they can be the focal point 
for disorder.142 The same can be said for former regime soldiers and leaders. These 
groups must be dealt with. Many will be capable of being integrated into a new force. 
Others will require demobilization and reintegration into society. The intent is to prevent 
former combatants from subnational groupings to arm or remain armed unless under the 
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supervision of a strong government.143 In this case sectarian forces are to be held in 
check by a strong externally imposed interim government. 
There is no need for a national military for external defense at the time of the 
intervention, as the intervening military forces will guarantee the external defense. The 
focus will be on building police forces for internal self-defense. The U.S. and the UN 
Charter are in this case the guarantors of state sovereignty. The development of a military 
force for external self defense is an unnecessary drain of manpower and resources early 
on. True this goes against Samuel Huntington’s prescription that country’s with an 
internal focus are prone to failure and abuse. However, this is the initial intervention 
period, in which an outside force is being introduced to cause change. This force will 
remain to protect the reforming state. During this transformative period the fledgling state 
will be vulnerable to extreme internal pressures that a military force intended for external 
defense should not be dealing with. It is not the purpose of an externally oriented military 
to be the police. There is a need to build, rebuild or repair local and national stabilizing 
forces that are capable of common policing as well as large-scale combat operations. 
Local civilian police, including traffic control, would be recruited and retained in their 
hometown, or district. A civilian controlled National Constabulary or Gendarme force 
would accomplish national Para-military policing. 
a. Local Policing 
In the initial intervention the security and protection of the population, key 
individuals and infrastructure falls to the RMC’s and their military forces. However, as 
the intervention progresses the indigenous capacity for self-defense must grow.  The 
PRT’s Justice Team will focus efforts on local capacity building. They will be staffed to 
build and deploy local police. The police in the PRT area of operations will be recruited 
and retained at local levels. The communities should be encouraged to raise their own 
local police forces from reliable elements. Once they are established and deemed 
operational they will replace the interim government’s military forces in the static 
positions. The mutual trust gained by allowing the local community to defend themselves 
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will help diffuse the potential for subversion.144 Many small civilian police organizations 
may seem cumbersome however; it is less prone to corruption and infiltration by 
subversive elements. Local organizations are prone to exploitation by regional powers 
such as warlords and criminal gangs however; as they are regional they can be isolated 
and dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The mission of the local police is to provide law 
enforcement, traffic control, and support to counterinsurgency operations and point 
defense at the lowest levels.  
b. National Level Policing 
The responsibility to build and deploy a national paramilitary police, 
gendarme or constabulary falls to the Interim Military Governor or Civilian 
Administrator.145 The recruiting, training, and maintaining of this force is to be 
coordinated through the Interim Ministry of the Interior. The recruiting and vetting of 
recruits will be conducted by the PRT via the same mechanism as the local police forces 
are recruited. In order for this force to be truly representative of the new state there must 
be national recruitment. This paramilitary police force replaces all pre-existing national 
military and national police forces. It may recruit, or take whole units in total, from the 
former military and police organizations so long as the individuals are properly vetted 
and approved by the interim government. The forces conducting the training of the 
national police initially should be from the intervention military forces or follow on 
forces. The integration of civilian police agency training teams is a must for investigative 
skill development and general criminal policing. There is no need for a competing 
ministry of defense as external protection falls on the intervention forces. By creating 
only a national and local police force, government can be streamlined, reducing potential 
conflict and competing interest. The mission of the national police is to provide law 
enforcement, counterinsurgency and border control. 
2. Interim Justice 
Interim Justice begins by the establishment of the rule of law and suppression of 
criminal elements. This is accomplished by the intervention military forces assigned to 
                                                 
 144 Army Field Manual, Vol 1, (UK) Counterinsurgency Operations (July 2001) B-3-12 
145 Keith Bickle, Mars Learning, The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-
1940, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2001) Chapter 4, “Intervention in the Dominican Republic and 
Lessons Learned,” 82 
66 
each RDZ and by the establishment of martial law. Interim justice continues through the 
conduct of a detailed survey of the judicial infrastructure. This will be followed by the 
rehabilitation of the judicial infrastructure. The courts will require physical infrastructure 
in the form of libraries, law schools and courtrooms. They will also require judges, 
lawyers and clerks. In war torn states these professionals may be part of an expatriate 
crowd or have been part of the former regime. They will have to be closely scrutinized by 
the survey team.  
In the initial response phase a review of the existing judicial system is critical. 
This review should identify the “indigenous legal professionals; select individuals for 
judicial positions; [&] establish a professional code of conduct for the judicial 
system.”146 It also includes a review of the systems infrastructure the physical courts, 
schools and libraries needed to run a judiciary. The next phase would be transformation 
that includes vetting, hiring and establishing legitimate legal professionals. In an invasion 
or intervention where the system has collapsed this would take some time.  
In the Iraqi case, there were an estimated twenty thousand lawyers and one 
thousand judges operating under the Saddam Regime.147 This organization was 
considered to be fairly impartial and devoid of undue governmental influence. There was 
a strong reservoir of candidates to re-initiate the legal profession even with Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 1, De-Ba’athification. However, the process 
of getting even a skeleton system in place took ninety days and did not take full effect 
until six months after the invasion. Not until 13 September 2003, did the CPA re-
establish the Iraqi Council of Judges. Until then no true centralized legal system existed 
in Iraq.148 As a default, the coalition military had to take over this role—a role for which 
it was ill prepared.  
Because the ROL is vital to security an enabling force should have a capability 
that can, in the extreme, act as the legitimate legal system or act somewhere in between 
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as a monitoring, vetting and training organization. This system could follow the design of 
the U.S. Federal Court system and be integrated into the regional PRT. The teams would 
include police, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, corrections, and court 
administrative personnel. They would carry with them codes and procedures for running 
a district office.149 A regional appeals court would be established at the higher more 
centralized level to oversee a group of RDZ.150 The judicial representation in the PRT 
will provide the local area an impartial court of law and the framework for the 
establishment of democratic legal reforms. The system would be designed around the 
special military court or military tribunal both have been traditionally utilized during 
martial law and military interventions. With this structure the interim military governor 
or RMC would have the proper tools to accomplish his dual mission of security and 
support for the joint force. This structure would facilitate the mission of enabling a stable 
security situation for all follow on civilian and military forces. 
With a judiciary and police comes the need for corrections facilities and 
personnel. The rules and regulations for incarceration of common criminals differ widely 
from those regarding former combatants. Criminal prisons and insurgent detention 
centers must be separate. The rehabilitation of former belligerents and insurgents must be 
conducted with the aim of turning these dissidents to associates. This is not just an 
international law requirement; it is a necessity for stabilization. The rehabilitation of 
insurgents can be of inestimable value to a counterinsurgency campaign.151 Former 
combatants brought over to the government side can be extremely useful in identifying 
other insurgents.152 Often they have proven capable of bringing them in without fighting. 
Insurgents unlike criminals fight to gain redress of grievances not necessarily for illicit 
gain. When the local ills that they fought to correct are addressed, they may be amenable 
to reintegration to society. When this occurs the former combatant will need to be 
employed and skill training is an important aspect. The reintroduction, returning 
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rehabilitated insurgents to the general populace will be important to the future of a war 
torn society. In the short-term extensive non-violent interrogations are required to 1) gain 
information and intelligence, 2) facilitate information operation themes, and 3) to discern 
the dedication and strength of the insurgency.  
3. Preventing Draconian Measures 
During stability operations the subversive and insurgent elements may conduct 
guerilla and terrorist campaigns. These conflicts are particularly draining on security 
forces. It is common in these operations for government forces to become enraged at the 
losses taken by an enemy they cannot engage in open battle. The underhanded, decidedly 
barbaric, and indiscriminant use of improvised explosives and suicide bombers can cause 
the desire for vengeance. Intervention forces in sustained operations must guard against 
the desire for retribution for these frustrating terrorist and guerilla attacks. Soldiers 
should be taught that the use of torture and mass punishment for these acts is contrary to 
the democratic ideals the intervention is espousing eventually causing more harm than 
good.153 Roger Trinquier’s work French Modern Warfare, exemplified codified abuse. 
He states that captured terrorist should not be treated as prisoners of war until after they 
are subjected to intense interrogation. He says that the interrogation is the price the 
terrorist must pay for not subscribing to the conventions of war. By falling into this trap 
short-term gains cost the counter-insurgent much of the international legitimacy 
necessary to the long-term success of the mission as a whole. 
Likewise, indigenous, sub-national forces must be prevented from seeking violent 
retribution for past injustice or ethnic repression. The intervention force, and eventually 
the indigenous security forces, must protect the various at-risk populations from revenge 
seekers. Programs of reconciliation and re-integration will be important to this process. 
The people must be given legitimate non-violent means to seek redress for decades of 
injustice. At times these programs will run against the culture as in cases of vendetta and 
blood feuds. It may even be that the intervention force is sympathetic to the idea of 
vengeance. However, allowing even minor infractions will only encourage greater 
abuses; there must be no tolerance of these draconian measures. 
                                                 
153 See the reflections of an American military interrogator on this matter in Lagouranis Anthony, 
"Tortured Logic," New York Times 2006. 
69 
4. Stabilization Goals 
The goals of sustainability according to the Joint Center for Strategic and 
International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army project Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Task Framework154 and the follow on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks155 
include the indigenous regulation of borders and boundaries; and the ability of the state to 
maintain freedom of movement along internal and international air, land and sea lines of 
communication and trade. It requires the conduct of common criminal policing and the 
establishment of transparent governance. A modern security infrastructure with national 
armed forces and security forces that is subordinate to the civilian government is a must. . 
These civilian controlled national defense and public safety forces once established must 
operate with minimal international oversight and support. Further regional security 
arrangements need to be established and monitored through the international community. 
The country will also need a permanent and independent justice system established with 
legal support extended to all communities regardless of ethnicity or minority status. This 
judiciary and legal system must be impartial with oversight provided by an Inspector 
General or General Accountability Office. 
Stabilization can be attained if after the initial deployment, the Progressive 
Reconstruction forces begin attacking the sources of guerrilla and criminal power 
immediately. The pre-empting of subversive activities by employing counter-insurgent 
tactics before insurgent group formation is the intent. Gaining and maintaining 
momentum by quickly establishing sufficient security presence across the targeted 
country is the initial method. The building of strong, competent, and corruption free 
police forces who can take over the security missions of the international forces backed 
by a legitimate judiciary is the long range goal. These forces would need the capacity to 
provide security and justice to the people demonstrating support visibly beneficial to the 
population at large. The forces must be capable of mobilizing the population, actively 
protecting them and involving as many as possible in the stabilization effort giving them 
belief in the new cause and of a better independent future. 
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B. RECONSTRUCTION 
Reconstruction encompasses the effort to create a self-governing polity by 
providing for basic needs, rehabilitation of the government, the economy, and otherwise 
improving the welfare of the people. Addressing the issues of governance and 
participation in a failed, failing or formerly rogue state requires the strengthening of local 
governments in the transition from indirect to independent rule. This is accomplished 
through the rapid establishment of RDZ and the placement of PRT governance and 
reconstruction units. This immediate activity in the wake of combat forces will 
demonstrate a strong commitment to the welfare of the indigenous population. The 
conservation of natural resources in both manpower and commodities will be a priority. 
The conduct of the basic services of governance will address the local governance, 
sanitation, subsistence and medical as well as infrastructure maintenance needs. Further 
the PRT will be commissioned to conduct training and education of the indigenous 
personnel to build local capacity for self-governance. 
A key piece of this program is the announcement of future plans and following 
through on these plans in a systematic and organized fashion.156 A continual progression 
of complimentary actions vice a tight time schedule is preferred although certain date 
driven deadlines must occur. An example of a date driven deadline would be the 
announced date for an election. Elections however, are not enough and must be followed 
by government action and sustained activity. This activity must encompass: humanitarian 
assistance, economic stabilization, infrastructure development, and justice and 
reconciliation.  
1. Governance and Participation: Indirect Rule and Institutionalization 
a. Indirect Rule  
Indirect rule is the involvement of the indigenous population in its own 
government; integrated, monitored and supported by foreign forces. It is imperative for 
many reasons to commit to indirect rule at the outset. Half measures that place too much 
burden on broken or fragile indigenous organizations or that attempt to rule with 
insufficient and poorly trained international personnel can be disastrous. Indirect rule 
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provides the protective framework for growing institutions. Unfortunately, the concept of 
indirect rule often has negative connotations.  
In the Congo during the eleven months when the legal government was 
non-existent, the UN had to assume colonial powers. This was accomplished despite the 
fact that “The UN operation in Congo lacked every element that history says is necessary 
for a successful peacekeeping mission.”157 From 1960-1961, with the collapse of the 
government, the UN took direct control of many of the institutions and missions of 
government. Supervising in an indirect manner, the UN controlled the airports, 
communications systems, and negotiations with secessionists, often intervening in local 
force clashes. They implemented media restrictions, and ordered the demobilization, 
disarmament and discipline of the legal army.158 Eventually ONUC was given the 
authority to use force and all possible means to restore law and order. The operation 
ended with the defeat of the rebels by ONUC on the government’s behalf. Neutrality was 
not possible. The violation of strict neutrality and sovereignty became unavoidable as UN 
forces became more involved in the secession issue.159 The need to build up a viable 
administration, restore Congolese army discipline, contain the civil war, and protect at 
risk populations forced ONUC to forcibly resolve the conflict. ONUC undertook direct 
military action to restore the parliamentary government and end Katanga’s secession.160 
In effect the UN forces had to conquer Katanga in order to construct a stable peace.161  
The first time in UN history that the sovereign state administration 
agencies bodies and offices, in ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, public 
security, and information were intentionally placed under UN control was in Cambodia 
under UNTAC. The peacekeeping force was commissioned to monitor the cease fire and 
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and training.162 They ran the elections and attempted to ensure human rights.163 
Unfortunately UNTAC’s civilian administration, police and peacekeeping units deployed 
slowly and in insufficient force.164 “Factional defiance towards UNTAC became more 
obvious when UNTAC’s key components proved unable to take effective, timely action 
due to belated deployment and paucity of personnel.165 Compounding the troubles the 
civilian UN administration could not operate effectively outside of Phnom Penh.  
In Cambodia UNTAC suffered from staffing problems with serious 
shortages of qualified personnel in areas ranging form public security to civil 
administration training.166 Experience was lacking and important positions went unfilled 
as they could not be filled adequately by local hires. The UN, with its typical ad hoc 
organization, recruited anyone willing to work in Cambodia. Standards of discipline, 
religious sensitivity, and knowledge of local customs were not a priority.167 This 
inexperience and lack of manpower, as well as enforcement and coercive capabilities, did 
little to keep the Khmer Rouge elements in line or in compliance with the disarmament 
and demobilization programs.168 The UN in general is not equipped or manned to handle 
the demands of rapid decisive operations or the post conflict governance that would 
follow. Yet it is not these poorly executed UN programs that discredited indirect rule.  
The negative connotation of indirect rule comes from its historical 
imperialist uses. Imperial colonialism used indirect rule in many locations, often fostering 
local rivalries, deliberately creating exploitable fissures to control regions. The French in 
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Morocco deemed that preserving aristocracies was essential for gaining and maintaining 
control. Local law and custom remained in place bolstered by French Advisors.169 
Colonialist rule was seen as the rule by the invisible hand behind the throne, not 
imperialist rule by direct administration.170 Under indirect rule martial law was often 
used as in the Fez Mutiny. As with martial law, indirect and direct rule can be perceived 
as tyrannical when applied towards exploitative imperialistic goals. Indirect rule in 
Morocco was implemented in a negative way fostering class and racial segregation 
among the Arabs and Berbers classically setting one above the other.171  
In Morocco, Lyautey abolished the local government and replaced it with 
ministries of foreign affairs, finance and war. He then established a parallel 
administration under the Secretariat General du Gouvernement. This nominally 
supporting government running parallel did not educate the Moroccans to fill the jobs 
needed for future self-governance.172 Note that a similar occurrence took place with the 
Belgians in the Congo later exacerbating the chaos of their withdrawal in the 1960’s. This 
failure to develop indigenous capacity did not match Lyautey’s rhetoric in which he 
proposed that indirect methods of administration should allow the colonial power to prop 
up the natural social hierarchy for the benefit of all. Unfortunately, it only served to 
enrich the powerful landowners, both foreign and domestic.173 Lyautey made two 
assumptions: one that native politics and native society was rife with division and was 
exploitable; this was generally true. Secondly, that native people preferred European 
prosperity to independence; this was generally a wrong assumption.174 Despite its 
checkered past an indirect government can be used to build up a foundation of custom 
and authority rather than undermine it and avoid transforming local chiefs into 
maquissards or underground fighters. Progressive Reconstruction uses direct and indirect 
rule as bandages, designed to progress the healing of the state towards independence. 
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Unlike imperialist or colonial actions Progressive Reconstruction attempts to use indirect 
rule as a building block for reconstructing the mechanisms of state. 
b. Institutionalization 
The writing of a constitution and the holding of elections are not an end, 
they are only a beginning. The historic mistake with elections is to use them as the signal 
to withdraw foreign forces. A successful election should be monitored for a considerable 
time and should continue to be supported by the interventionist forces. SSTR operations 
should continue at least for the length of the first term of a duly elected government. Two 
full successful and relatively violence free election cycles should pass before stable peace 
should be declared. Institutionalization, the building of indigenous mechanisms of 
governance, is a time consuming process. It is also a dangerous process, particularly 
democratic institution building. A fledgling democracy is at risk with each new election. 
Democratic methods have been exploited by violent and criminal organizations and 
individuals from Hitler to Hamas. Anecdotally, one could say that when you wish to 
create a democracy you have to be careful what you wish for. Can the interventionist live 
with all the potentialities? This is one of the reasons why Progressive Reconstruction as 
heavy as it is in resources and manpower is the right thing to do. A solid and purposeful 
investment at the outset will garner more respect and influence over the course of events 
than an ad hoc, half hearted or piecemeal effort.  
2. Humanitarian Assistance, Economic Stabilization, and Infrastructure 
Development in a Counterinsurgency Environment 
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Humanitarian Assistance is the provision of basic needs for survival in the role of 
subsistence support and emergency services while economic stabilization and 
infrastructure development is the provision of essential elements of economic well-being. 
These programs will be facilitated by the integration of imbedded governmental, non-
governmental and private volunteer organization liaisons and contracting specialists in 
the PRT framework within a standing Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The 
CMOC will prevent duplication of effort and lost time on projects in each RDZ. The 
humanitarian organization element will greatly assist the rapid flow and distribution of 
aid to the people most in need. The contracting specialist within the PRT will advance the 
visible benefits of economic aid by writing local contracts for facility construction and 
repair and transportation of aid.  
These programs are all security dependent. The protection and operation 
of public works and the provision of electricity and clean water are important to a post 
conflict society and are key targets of a counterinsurgency campaign. The development 
of an economic base and the infrastructure of the state agencies are important in the long 
run for the success of independence and in the short term to the regime of population and 
resource control. One of the most effective means of restarting an economy is through 
wages. The PRT will provide for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of infrastructure as 
often as possible through contracted indigenous workers. These workers, schoolteachers, 
policemen, construction etc all need to be paid. Quick and continuous payment of salaries 
will reinforce the desire of the locals to work with the U.S. forces. To this end the 
Progressive Reconstruction force needs a focused and reliable means to pay out cash for 
services thereby stimulating the local economy. The Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program, created by Brig. Gen. David N. Blackledge, Commander, 352nd Civil Affairs 
Command, in Iraq, has demonstrated flexibility in providing cash quickly and 
continuously at local levels.175 National regulation of this program is necessary since too 
much cash inflow will destabilize the economy and too little will create unnecessary 
hardship.  
By taking note of what insurgents are trying to do politically and 
militarily—pick a fight, cause havoc, cause the interventionist force to loose credibility 
and gain for themselves the support of the population—it can be seen that force alone 
cannot defeat an insurgency. Insurgencies are local. The issues that motivate the average 
insurgent are local conditions. Transnational terrorists are outside agents, the same as 
intervention forces, and cannot exist without the support of the local people. Che 
Guevara’s ill-fated attempt at revolution in Bolivia is a good example of the failure to 
gain and maintain local support by an introduced insurgent ‘foco’.176 Therefore counter-
insurgency must focus on localized solutions; attacking unstable politics and economics 
locally with indigenous support. 
                                                 
175 Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing, Commander's Emergency Response Program 14 January 
2004,  http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040114-1144.html; (3 April 2006) 
176 John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun:, A history of Guerilla, Revolutionary and Counterinsurgency 
Warfare, from the Romans to the Present. (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1995) 220. 
76 
Population and resource controls cross the boundaries of development and 
counterinsurgency. The employment of indigenous workers, the rationing of supplies, 
census taking and the establishment of a national identification card program as well as 
taxation are all essential elements of both a counterinsurgency and a reconstruction 
campaign. Civic Action to provide basic services and infrastructure repair that fully 
involves the local population will in effect reduce the provocation towards subversion. 
Work programs sponsored by the PRT can dry up the well of insurgent recruits. 
“[Lyautey’s] officers were expected to show initiative: build roads, dig wells, [and] 
vaccinate the population against disease,...”177 They were to undertake civic programs to 
bring the indigenous population into the government camp. Economics and 
counterinsurgency are fully entwined as the more intrusive control mechanisms such as a 
national identification card program will be easier to accept if tied to a positive economic 
outcome. 
Population controls become even more difficult in major metropolitan 
areas. The political and economic magnetism of Mogadishu and other capital cities is a 
spur to conflict transcending interventions over the course of history.178 Cities like 
Mogadishu need to be deflated and devalued. These big cities attract the impoverished 
from the more rural areas with the promise of work and shelter. Yet the promise is 
generally a mirage leaving a growing pool of disaffected unemployed. The indigent 
population needs to be given incentive to leave the city for a better life in outlying less 
populated easier to manage regions. A process of voluntary relocation can be attempted 
to facilitate this. PRT and RDZ will play a major role in this endeavor as they will create 
the economic and social stability that will draw people away from the metropolitan areas. 
In the Dominican Republic the Marines, recognizing this issue, pushed out 
of the cities and established what they called ‘bush garrisons.’ These garrisons put the 
Marines in direct contact with the poorer rural population, the population most at risk of 
guerilla influence. The Marines built roads and laid telephone lines to connect the 
villages with the urban centers. This was a tactic that increased security and bolstered the 
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economy at the same time. Lyautey in Morocco tried to establish centers of influence and 
attraction away from the main cites and bazaars, via the Arab Bureau, to better control 
the population and win them over economically. It was said that the French army did not 
occupy points on a map, but rather it occupied military economic zones. Nor was it 
simply an army. Under Lyautey’s program of political and economic as well as military 
pacification it had transformed into a multifaceted civ-mil organization capable of long 
term reconstruction activity. This as opposed to UNTAC which according to the UN 
Mandate, was not invited to develop long term economic reconstruction and was entirely 
Phnom Pen oriented.179  
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Stabilization and reconstruction are the core of any intervention program. 
Progressive reconstruction is no exception. While it focuses on a quick start and the 
enabling actions that set the stage for potential success, it is only through long-term 
commitment that the goal of a stable peace can be attained. The elements of war and the 
unpredictable nature of its outcome weigh heavily on the intervention. Subversive 
elements, both criminal and militant, wait in the wings looking for the fissures and flaws 
in the program to attack and exploit. Counter-subversion, insurgency, and criminality 
considerations must be integrated into every activity. Here the unity of a solitary 
command ensures that no programs act contrary to the national effort. Indigenous 
cooperation in their own defense is fostered by the development of local and national 
police forces. These forces subordinate to a transparent and corruption free ministry of 
justice and recruited by the PRT represent the future. The system of interim justice 
following the direct to indirect to independent rule model will have the benefit of a 
progressive evolution to either repair and rebuild or construct anew a permanent justice 
system.  
As an intervention turns towards transition to indigenous government the battle 
for legitimacy will be fought. The insurgents will foster their form of state building to 
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counter that of the interim government. In this struggle asymmetric conflicts will arise. 
Terrorism and guerilla warfare will abound in the struggle to gain control of the 
population. The line of distinction drawn in conventional wars between combatant and 
non-combatant will blur and a tendency towards reprisal and vengeance may arise. The 
police and justice systems are keys to the prevention of potential draconian actions by 
both the foreign military and local forces angered over terrorist attacks or past injustice. 
The penetration of the peripheries by PRT and the promotion of economic and social 
development will help the war torn state to recover and facilitate reconciliation. 
Reconciliation programs started at the lowest local levels by the PRT will reduce tensions 
and the tendency to violence.  
Governance and participation starts with the transition from direct to indirect rule 
and progresses to independence. It is through the process of institutionalization that the 
indigenous government will be built and strengthened. With each new program started 
and turned over to local control the intervention forces can begin to back out. 
Humanitarian assistance, economic and infrastructure development in a 
counterinsurgency environment balanced on population and resource controls are fully 
integrated programs dependent one upon the other. The effort to create a self-governing 
polity by providing for basic needs, rehabilitation of the government, the economy, and 
otherwise improving the welfare of the people is the ultimate goal. Once the government 
and the security forces are stable, the democratic processes in place, then the intervention 









































V. CONCLUSION: THE END STATE - STABLE PEACE 
Military interventions have been fundamentally changed as a result of the 
September 11th attacks on the Pentagon and New York. Moreover, the U.S. and NATO 
intervention in Afghanistan and U.S. and Coalition intervention in Iraq have indelibly 
colored post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in ways unimaginable at the turn of 
the century. The full implication of these tumultuous events has not yet been realized. 
There is however, an increased recognition that failure to intervene to halt rogue states, to 
stem the spread of anarchy and chaos caused by failed states negatively affects world 
peace. Western powers even operating under UN auspices cannot maintain the neutrality 
and impartiality once considered imperative to these operations, sides will be chosen or 
as in regime change the sides will be forcibly created. Because of the theory that 
instability and chaos can and do spread where there is a lack of good governance, there is 
an increased proclivity towards state building interventions vice more traditional, but still 
difficult, peacekeeping or enforcement.  
Due to the increased likelihood of violence when it is a U.S. lead or supported 
operation one would think Americans would become risk averse and these operations 
become less prevalent. That is not the case. With the global war on terrorism and the 
desire to stem the spread of WMD, the U.S. is more prone to intervene in the affairs of 
other states and there is some acceptance that this intervention is more likely to be 
violent. Paradoxically, the U.S. military does not like these small wars. Though it is the 
only force capable of conducting foreign operations of this magnitude in the face of 
hostile action it is not organized or temperamentally disposed to do so. Yet, interventions 
are far more common than conventional wars. And the U.S. military will be involved so 
long as vital national interests are tied to the actions. This being the case the U.S. military 
will participate and needs to evolve a methodology and mindset to deal effectively with 
these activities.  
A. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 
The American Way of war is unique. Therefore, the U.S. cannot enter into a 
military intervention without falling back to its root culture. The U.S. has the capacity to 
and should exploit its penchant towards overwhelming organization and overwhelming 
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force, the Powell-Weinberger doctrine. Failure to utilize the capacity to overwhelm, to 
play towards the U.S. strength, to plan for all aspects of the inevitable conflict to include 
stabilization reconstruction and transition leading to withdraw of forces is foolhardy. In 
the case of Progressive Reconstruction overwhelming force is in regard to empathic force 
vice more traditional kinetic force.  
From the General Order #20 issued by General Winfield Scott in the Mexican 
war to the Lieber Code of the U.S. Civil War and on to the USMC Small Wars Manual 
and the Army and Navy Manual for Military Government and Civil Affairs in WWII the 
progression of U.S. military stabilization and reconstruction efforts has been guided by 
certain principles. The primary principle is the belief in liberal democratic government 
and that war is waged against the government of a state and its military not against the 
people of the state. There is also inherent in these doctrines the concept of the application 
of force, the appropriate amount of force necessary to achieve the desired end state, the 
defeat of that regime and the army that supports it. This has required the destruction of 
the infrastructure that supports the warfighting capability of the regime and the army. 
These doctrines were set aside with the advent of the UN Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions which prevented interstate wars but allowed for internal conflicts. New 
doctrines arose, doctrines that called on U.S. forces to support regimes or to act in a 
neutral and impartial manner separating warring factions. With today’s pre-emptive strike 
strategy, with the resurgence of state building as a legitimate use of military forces there 
is a need to restructure the doctrine. 
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This thesis begs the question: can Progressive Reconstruction work? Can it be the 
new method, the new doctrine for state building? It is a program that reflects the U.S. 
National Security Strategy of pre-emptive intervention to combat the threats caused by 
the proliferation of WMD, failed and rogue terrorist supporting states. It follows the 
political military goals set out by the strategy at the operational and tactical levels. It 
recognizes that small wars are the most common conflicts and develops a plausible 
solution via both short and long term actions. It recognizes the fragility of states during 
and after intervention and prescribes a methodological approach through which the 
democratic institutions can be planted and developed. It focuses on developing 
indigenous capability and gaining, through close continuous contact, the support of the 
people. Most importantly it is a viable and comprehensive plan that can with little 
adjustment and fine tuning be applied to all U.S. lead interventions.  
Two coexisting architectural structures are involved in interventions (1) the 
destructive and (2) the reconstructive. The two structures need to be fully intertwined and 
balanced on each other. In the initial implementation process rapid decisive operations 
(RDO) as the kinetic form of war will tend to the former as the main effort focused on the 
defeat of conventional belligerent forces. As the intervention progresses the stabilization 
efforts as the empathic form of war take the role of main effort and combat operations 
fade to a supporting role. The military role becomes one of implementation or enabling, 
setting the stage for the next act. The next act is the insertion of purpose built 
stabilization and reconstruction forces and the inflow of follow on forces. Progressive 
Reconstruction, through rapid decisive stabilization (RDS), is the link between RDO and 
the end state, the goal of sustainable peace. It is the bridging mechanism that implements 
RDS in conjunction with RDO and follows through with more intensive stabilization and 
reconstruction of the state. Generally there is a lag time between the two types of 
operations in which the relative superiority of the assault is lost. Progressive 
Reconstruction operations on the heels of combat operations can capture this normally 
lost advantage and use it to prepare a stabile environment for follow-on forces.  
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What this thesis has focused on is the development of a methodology for SSTR 
operations that compliments U.S. military strength in the RDO. It looks at RDS as the 
necessary corollary to RDO. A system of state building that runs parallel and in tight 
coordination with combat operations. It is at first a supporting effort that transitions to the 
supported main effort. It recognizes the preeminence of U.S. forces in there combat roles 
and assumes the victory over conventional opponents. It further recognizes that 
insurgency is inevitable. In fact it views insurgency as a competing asymmetric state 
building program. It is a competition for allegiance of the people who constitute the state. 
It is a competition for legitimacy. Who is more legitimate, the foreign imposed regime or 
the locally born resistance movement? Who has the monopoly or preponderance of 
violence; the side with the tanks and airplanes or the side that can run a car bomb or 
suicide bomber into the market place the tank just left or the plane over flew? The 
Progressive Reconstruction efforts focus on enabling SSTR by restoring law and order 
and developing the means for governance from the bottom up. The competition, the 
insurgents and subversives, focus on the destruction of these programs and the 
development of alternatives that make them into a legitimate resistance, the maquissards. 
The intent is to force the neutral people to choose sides.   
The counterinsurgent must develop techniques and tactics that are homegrown 
that reflect the culture and values of the people of the state. That does not mean however 
that certain amounts of institutionalization cannot be done from the outside. General 
Douglas Macarthur’s constitution for the Japanese people is the most evident example of 
a lasting and successful document imposed from the outside. It may not be necessary to 
impose a whole constitution, but the imbedding of certain international norms for human 
rights and suffrage can be highly successful long term actions. What Progressive 
Reconstruction stresses is the end state: self-governance, self-sustaining economics and 
broad based reconciliation. It is a pre-designed program intent on developing the 
institutions of the market economy and the liberal democracy. The measure of 
effectiveness in an intervention is the establishment of a sustainable peace. When 
preparing for this type of intervention the U.S. must recognize certain facts. The first 
being that the conflict will be asymmetric: a conflict between insurgents and counter-
insurgents (or freedom fighters vs. foreign occupation). Secondly, in this conflict the U.S. 
is the foreign occupying force and will inevitably play the role of counter-insurgent. 
Therefore, the U.S. must plan to seek the end state in the role of the government forces — 
a role that requires a far greater amount of manpower and resources than the insurgent 
and carries a preconceived image problem. 
1. Integration of the Warfighting Phases 
By integrating Phase IV preliminary actions into the Phase I-III activities the U.S. 
forces and their allies can dictate the tempo. RDS operations are the integrated deploying 
of enabling forces for future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Stabilization and 
reconstruction forces fully integrated with the RDO forces will prevent a power vacuum 
and growth of lawlessness. This facilitates the imposition of temporary direct rule, the 
move to indirect rule, and eventual independence and stable peace.  
This integration is not currently U.S. military doctrine. Current doctrine considers 
rear area operations, those operations in areas behind the military front lines, as 
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supporting efforts for the further prosecution of combat operations. The idea that combat 
operations are an enabling force for integrated and follow on stabilization and 
reconstruction would be a major departure from the practiced norm. Progressive 
Reconstruction is a natural follow-on to offensive operations that transitions the country 
back to civilian rule. This is a continuum from unstable peace to conflict to 
reconstruction to stable peace. Look at the concept of effects based operations: if the 
desired effect is the collapse of the enemy will and capacity to resist a military force will 
operate in one way. If the desired effect is the stabilization of the target state with the 
intent of conducting state building operations a military force will operate considerably 
different. 
In Phase III, decisive operations, now considered RDO, the insertion of military 
forces into the targeted state must occur before stabilization. It would be pointless to 
airdrop a PRT onto an enemy armored division or a Somali tribe led by a hostile warlord 
as the initial combat operation it is far more effective to launch an air-strike with armor 
destroying cluster munitions. But this is common sense application of conventional 
combat power. Common sense also dictates that phase IV operations should be parallel 
and complimentary with the decisive operations. Or more clearly phase I-II should 
happen in tandem. Phase III should be utilized as an enabling operation for Phase IV. If 
this is accomplished then the initial ground work for certain Phase IV activities will be 
laid in Phase III; for instance, establishing the rule of law. Basically if the common end 
state is a stable peace then both RDO and RDS should work together to achieve that goal. 
For example, looting as we discussed in Chapter IV ‘happens’ it is a natural 
byproduct of the loss of governmental controls in the form of the ROL.180 It is a reaction 
by people who are scared, who see no future options, and do not want to go without food, 
water and shelter. It is also exploited by criminal elements in society. It however can be 
halted or stymied through a combination of strict law enforcement and efficient provision 
                                                 
180 Sean Loughlin, “Rumsfeld on looting in Iraq: 'Stuff happens' Administration asking countries for 
help with security,” CNN Washington Bureau, Saturday, April 12, 2003 Posted: 12:24 AM EDT (0424 
GMT), http://www.cnn.com/2003/U.S./04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/ 
85 
of aid. The prevention of looting is a requirement of the Geneva Conventions,181 it is also 
a stated goal of U.S. military forces so long as its prevention does not halt or hinder 
active combat operations. In Iraq the prevention of looting was not a priority of the RDO 
forces, they were not equipped to deal with the situation and still conduct combat 
operations. Anti-looting operations traditionally fall to rear area operations. 
Unfortunately during OIF-1 the rear areas where not organized to accomplish this task 
and it was not accomplished. The rear area commanders did not exercise the rule of law 
as they were not manned to do so. Their focus was entirely the supplying of the frontline 
troops — a monumental task in and of itself. Complimentary Phase I-II actions could 
have identified and averted the breakdown of the rule of law during Phase III by 
incorporating certain aspects of Phase IV operations into the overall concept of the 
operation from planning to execution. 
Integration of the phases for decisive action and stabilization is imperative. If the 
end state of both is the establishment of a stable peace, as stated in DoD Directive 
3000.05, then the actions taken should be complimentary. As discussed in Chapter III, the 
best known historically successful, twentieth century, counterinsurgency campaigns are 
the British in Malaya, the U.S. in Greece and in the Philippines. In all three cases the 
counterinsurgency forces were eventually integrated and subordinated to the political or 
civilian goals and infrastructure. In other words stabilization took precedence to combat. 
The roles followed the supported and supporting concept. In Iraq specifically this was not 
the case and seems to still be a struggle.  
2. Failure of U.S. Warfighting Doctrine, Regarding SSTR 
Many U.S. commanders and senior officials failed to understand the concept that 
in a state building activity combat operations are second to political operations. Common 
refrains of the warfighters echoed this concept: “we only destroy things”, or “we fight, 
 not DoD”. A further gap develops when DoD and DoS are not rebuild, that is for the DoS
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not integrated in their effort, or when one agency relies on the other to perform activities 
it is unprepared for. Unfortunately, the DoS has far too few personnel and resources to 
conduct these operations and the DoD would prefer to remain in the strictly combat or 
warfighting business. This attitude was and possibly is still a prevailing thought in 
military circles. Like Clausewitz, the U.S. military does not like insurgency or guerilla 
warfare. Even our specialists in this field, the Special Forces, prefer direct action combat 
operations to less dramatic unconventional warfare-stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. Often these Special Forces officers recognize the need for civil affairs but do 
not consider the current civil affairs personnel to be as professional or competent as 
warfighters. Phase IV operations are relegated to the same position. Instead of being 
integrated as equal and perhaps more important activities they are viewed as separate and 
unequal.   
Once again the question is what takes priority the military or the political. 
Following strictly with U.S. Clauswitzian doctrine it would be said that war is but another 
form of politics. In fact diplomatic politics assumes a supporting role to the pursuit of the 
wars goal, the military defeat of the enemy. In an insurgency there is a different 
separation; politics is the superior form of war. Political action outweighs military action. 
Look at Reconstruction after the U.S. civil war. The activities of the Klu Klux Klan were 
nasty and tended to organize a visible form of resistance however the true ‘victory’ of the 
former Confederates was won with legal actions, the creation of separate but equal 
legislation to deflate the affect of the 13-15th Amendments.182 In this way the 
Confederates won major concessions from the militarily victorious North that lasted 
another hundred plus years.  
So by saying stabilization and decisive combat operations are intended to achieve 
the same common goal of a stable peace we are arguing against U.S. military doctrine. 
The U.S. military views itself as a Clauswitzian combat organization, built and bred to 
fight wars. Wars being the theoretical total war in which combat becomes politics and all  
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activities of political nature become suborned to military exigency. In an insurgency, an 
operation intent on creating a stable peace, or developing a sustainable free democracy 
that type of warfare does not exist.  
 
B. THE SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
A sustainable peace requires a strong and liberal law code implemented through 
legislation, reflecting basic human rights. Human rights monitoring, training and capacity 
building agencies sponsored by the government and indigenous non-governmental 
agencies. Corrections and detention facilities and staffs funded, trained and monitored in 
compliance with national and international laws. Reconciliation projects including courts 
and tribunals, reparations commissions, investigative and apprehension apparatus, and 
outreach programs fully supported and operational. Community rebuilding, confidence 
building, religious tolerance, and women’s rights are also important elements of the 
reconstruction. Refugees and internally displaced persons must be protected and 
reintroduced to the community. In other words it is a huge project, and potentially 
extremely costly in time, dollars and personnel. 
Because of its great attendant cost, nation-state building has been avoided.  
However, with the global threat of terrorism, avoidance is no longer possible. Therefore, 
the need for a comprehensive methodology to guide international actors, to assist with the 
formulation of plans and actions is absolutely necessary. Progressive Reconstruction is a 
method by which the United States and or the international community can successfully 
reestablish stability in war shattered, failed or rogue states. This type of intervention is a 
last resort intended to forcibly bring the target state back into the international 
community as a productive not destructive member. It is not neo-colonialism although it 
is involvement in another nation’s internal affairs.183 If the target state has been 
determined to be a failed or rogue state by the international community and the mandate 
for the intervention is clear then the intervention is legitimate.184 With the proper 
planning and allocation of manpower and material resources it will work.  
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It is important because it will reduce the threat of terrorist supporting rogue states. 
It will bring another nation into the productive world body. It will assist the 
noncombatant majorities within these states to achieve self-determination and democracy. 
It works best when instituted from the beginning. It can be used after but it will be 
harder.185 The methodology of Progressive Reconstruction will assist forward deployed 
elements with the seizure and maintenance of the initiative. Recognizing and capitalizing 
on the fact that influence is strongest immediately after the first decisive action. An 
immediate influx of stabilization forces will further destabilize the enemy, disrupt any 
remain behind force operations and prevent the establishment of guerilla vanguard units.  
It will also provide some tangible evidence to the population that the U.S. is there to 
liberate and rebuild the country, not destroy and exploit. The overall goal of the 
intervention is to change the political situation through military means, but once combat 
is over there needs to be a visible change in newly pacified or liberated areas. The overt 
demonstration of the benefits of the intervention and of the future benefits of democracy 
must become the focus of operations.   
 
C. EXPLOITING WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY 
The end of the war brings about radical changes to the social condition. Time 
works against the reconstruction effort. Failure to provide basic services, guarantee 
rights, provide prosperity and education in a timely fashion undermines the effort. 
Loser’s remorse may create hostility. Political inexperience of oppressed or newly 
liberated peoples, particularly those arising from autocratic and socialist states can be 
destabilizing. The windows of opportunity to affect lasting legal reform are fleeting. The 
insertion of PRT and the structure of the RDZ and interim government discussed in this 
thesis will facilitate the exploitation of these fleeting moments. 
The “window of opportunity” in stabilization and reconstruction operations 
generally appears at the very beginning of an operation before opposition has time to 
organize. Defined a window of opportunity (hereafter window) is a brief, fleeting, 
moment in time during which critical decisions made or not made have immense long 
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and short term impact. Windows can be lengthened; shortened or entirely missed. Often 
they are only recognized too late, after the fact. In the course of this thesis many different 
post-conflict operations, have been discussed. However, in every case studied there was a 
window in some cases multiple windows. There are also a host of reasons why for the 
most part the windows were missed. 
After the U.S. Civil War during Reconstruction windows were most apparent in 
the ability to pass legislation in particular the 13th (1865), 14th (‘68) and 15th (‘70) 
Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. These pieces of legislation would have 
been impossible to pass prior to the war. Once enacted, they had the protection of the 
Constitution. The unfortunate side, that demonstrates the fleeting nature of windows, is 
that as time wore on these pieces of legislation lost power. They were circumvented by a 
resurgent ancient regime. The failings were recognized and efforts were made by the 
Federal Government to try to give the legislation back its teeth, notably the Enforcement 
Acts (’70-71) but they could not be policed. The last effort, the Civil Rights Act, was 
found unconstitutional in 1883. The window closed when Federal Troops withdrew in 
’77.  Reconstruction demonstrated the pliability of a state in the initial moments and 
years following an internal civil war. It also demonstrated the vulnerability of a state 
struggling to reconcile the effects of civil war. Windows it seems need viable and visible 
strength to keep them open.  
Again windows are most apparent at the outset of an operation. In places like 
Morocco the best opportunity for enacting change was after foreign troops won a 
conventional conflict. The colonialist gained the advantage when they would break a 
regional military force in a conventional battle. The influx of troops and the expenditure 
of capital demonstrating strength, commitment, and force of will, caused the indigenous 
forces to comply with foreign rule. This momentum was lost and the window closed as 
the imperialist cut cost, reduced troop strength while increasing the exploitation of the 
local economy and manpower. Time and again the colony would slip into long term 
desultory guerilla war. 186 
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WWII offers a unique insight into the window theory as in its course three 
different post-conflict states can be reviewed. It seems as if the learning curve started in 
Italy and progressively improved from Germany to Japan. Italy was the test bed for new 
civil affairs and American Military Government (AMG) techniques. Rebuilding civil 
society after the functioning government collapsed. Here the window that appeared was 
not taken advantage of as the practitioners, the AMG, were not prepared, they did not 
anticipate the fragility of the Italian government. According to Benson and Neufeld the 
AMG failed to seize upon the momentum created by the unforeseen collapse of the 
Fascist government. The AMG did not know enough about Italy to predict the fragility of 
Mussolini’s regime.187  
When discussing windows the conversation drifts towards the concept of 
momentum. In warfare gaining and maintaining the momentum is considered extremely 
important. It fits into the Principles of War regarding speed and surprise and the ability to 
mass. Without solid knowledge (intent, capability, strengths and weaknesses) of the 
enemy a military force cannot fully exercise its power. The same concepts are applicable 
in post-conflict operations. Prior planning, preset goals, and clear intent and objectives 
are all military necessities; and are just as necessary in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. Ask the question: what would have happened if the Marshal Plan had been 
organized and preplanned in 1944 to be set in place immediately after Allied troops 
entered Germany in 1945? What could have happened if this template was then given to 
the Japanese Occupation planners to use as a baseline?  
Instead of a haphazard and piecemeal deployment and institution of activities, a 
more organized but still flexible program is needed. The highlights from past occupations 
are the institution of legislation, the Japanese Constitution for example or the mandatory 
inclusion of women in both Afghanistan and Iraq’s parliaments. It is noted however, that 
as in Reconstruction legislation can be circumvented. The inclusion of women in 
government runs against fundamentalist Islamic ideology setting the stage for future 
conflict but, not including these provisions will only prolong the suppression of basic 
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human and civil rights. An intervention that seeks to create lasting change must take full 
advantage of the windows offered, the ability to dictate long lasting legislated change is 
one method. In the UN actions in Cambodia and Somalia the window was missed 
primarily because the forces deployed where unable to enforce the ceasefires, disarm the 
warlords, and influence the micro-governance of the state outside the major urban 
areas.188 
However, this is not the only use of windows. In Iraq the author witnessed the 
loss of a window first hand. Just three weeks after the initial invasion the U.S. military 
had utterly destroyed the Iraqi military and ruled the land. What the coalition forces said 
the Iraqis followed. The Iraqi’s, at this critical time, were willing to work with the 
coalition forces to make their lives better. The opportunity was fleeting, lasting only a 
few months. Although expectations were very high, the window was lost because we 
could not deliver. 
It is apparent that this is not an isolated phenomenon. In Somalia the intervention 
of U.S. forces was initially greeted with open arms, and restraint on the part of warlords 
(most likely out of fear and respect for power). Even after the events of 3 October 1993, 
which were captured in Blackhawk Down, a second window was created.  As the Marines 
landed to conduct the withdraw, the Somali warlords backed down and the common 
people looked to the U.S. in hope again.189 This hope was crushed as the U.S. and UN 
forces were ordered to abandon the cause.  
The question is how can the window be capitalized? A military operation based 
on pre-emption or reactions to a failing state is initiated by the intervener. The initiating 
action in accordance with relative superiority theory will create a window. The initial 
military invasion itself is the catalyst. Post conflict in the initial phases must be viewed as 
an integral component of the combat operation. It requires the same detailed planning and 
execution that the DoD puts into the initial deployment. The enabling actions create a 
predictable window for exploitation and implementation of SSTR operations. The 
window will not last long and once lost is difficult to recover. However, noting Somalia 
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and Congo, the insertion of new troops or personal prestige—Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s personal intervention in the Congo over the Katanga secession 
question—can open windows that had previously been shut.  
Direct action by military forces and by prominent persons or states can, as 
espoused in the theory of Relative Superiority, be used to create or reopen windows. 
According to the theory of Special Operations as written by Admiral William McRaven 
Relative Superiority is “a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, 
gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy…Relative Superiority is 
achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement when decisive advantage is achieved, 
usually within five minutes of the initial engagement…Once Relative Superiority is 
achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee victory…If Relative Superiority is 
lost, it is difficult to regain.” And “The longer an engagement continues, the more likely 
the outcome will be affected by the will of the enemy.”190 The theory of Relative 
Superiority can be applied to post conflict reconstruction and stabilization and in 
particular how to capture a “window of opportunity.” It requires these principles: 
simplicity, security, repetition (rehearsals and integrated planning), surprise (timing), 
speed (tempo of the operations), and purpose (clear, defined, achievable and understood 
by all). The optimum course of action would have the indigenous people going to bed on 
Monday night with the status quo in place, but in jeopardy, and awakening the next 
morning to the overwhelming presence of the intervention forces who guarantee security, 
humanitarian relief and have a clear, flexible and achievable plan for the future. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are more issues involved in the complex activities of military intervention, 
stabilization and state building than can be covered in any single document. Every 
intervention is unique and fraught with dangers. Techniques vary from hard to soft; it is 
the recommendation of this concept of operation that a heavy, overwhelming force and 
organization be used to enable success. Indirect rule, colonial ghosts, the fear caused by 
the transferring of western values to non western societies all will be causes for 
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resistance. Legitimacy for the intervention force will be hard to come by. As stated 
earlier, altruism is not going to be accepted as a reason for intervention. Strength, will 
and commitment are where legitimacy will be found. War alters the social order, there are 
winners and losers and there are unintended consequences. War tends toward absolutes, 
as Clausewitz would say; a state emerging from conflict will absolutely be fragile. 
Immediate fostering of economic and humanitarian reconstruction bent on the eventual 
reintegration of the state into the world market is a means of demonstrating tangible 
improvement and reducing this fragility. Security, the rule of law and Governance are the 
principle driving forces.  
Interventionist rule and can implement security, the rule of law and governance 
through undemocratic fiat yet democracy is part of the end state. This dichotomy will not 
be easily accepted, but it is a reality, it is one of the many hard choices involved in 
military intervention. In the immediacy of post conflict the vast majority of the 
population tends towards passivity, wanting to be shown what to do to survive and 
prosper. Martial law and imposed order is a method the intervener can use because 
someone has to be in charge. Without someone posted in charge, natural leaders—
warlords, insurgents, criminals and strongmen of the ancient regime—take charge. The 
intervention planners must have a plan to create a legitimate government. There is a need 
to avoid quick fixes. Interveners tend to drift towards the most available stabilizing force 
often organized crime, warlords and other armed sub-national entities. A conscious effort 
must be made not to revert to the ancien regime or these criminal elements for stability if 
no other strong force steps in. Further, if the warlords as in Afghanistan assist with the 
downfall of the former regime then these leaders and their troops have to be treated 
differently. They must be treated like partisan heroes and they must be pensioned off as 
you disarm and demobilize. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs are 
tools in the kit to foster the growth of stability. 
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The current iterations of the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and 
Iraq are the right concept. They should be expanded in scope and implementation. Clear, 
hold, rebuild—rehabilitation while fighting, or rolling stabilization is the method 
espoused to capture windows of opportunity in SSTR and to focus both RDO and RDS 
operations towards long term success—the stable peace. Insurgency is a state building 
theory that attacks the legitimacy, governmental policy and the recreated economy of the 
intervention and must be countered in the same vein. Counterinsurgency mechanisms 
must be designed to answer the insurgent theory. The interim government exercising 
direct and indirect rule along with the follow-on independent indigenous governments 
must acknowledge the globalized values of human rights to defeat the archaistic and 
anarchistic activity of insurgents. The use of an interim government and the methodology 
of Progressive Reconstruction as described in this thesis will facilitate the rapid defeat of 
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